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Homeland security and national security events of the 21st century require a fresh 
look at an important and often ignored facet of leadership that can be simply referred to 
as advice. Public leaders at all levels of government face increasing demands to make 
good decisions under the pressure and urgency of crisis circumstances. Advisors can 
provide the necessary guidance and support for executive decision makers. This thesis 
examines the relationship between advisors who support executive decision makers in the 
homeland security enterprise and national security domain, and the factors that influence 
effectiveness in the advice process. First, this thesis examines the viewpoints of current 
academic social science research. Second, a case study methodology is used to explore 
the experiences of practitioners who serve as both executive decision makers and 
advisors. Finally, the case-study analysis incorporates contemporary social science 
research to produce recommendations that can assist both public leaders and advisors in 
understanding the factors that lead to effectiveness. 
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The events of September 11, 2001, in the United States ushered in an era of new 
challenges for public leaders at all levels of government. Threats at home intersect with 
the transnational threats faced abroad, as issues of homeland and national security 
become further interconnected. This is particularly true as the nation’s homeland security 
landscape has expanded to encompass a portfolio of responsibilities associated with 
responses to catastrophic events and other risks. This evolution highlights the 
acceleration of complexities and interdependencies that unfold during decision-making, 
where responses to previously isolated events or circumstances now pose the potential for 
a cascade of unintended consequences. In the face of this evolving landscape, public 
leadership needs to rely on subject matter expertise and guidance under the pressure of 
high-stake demands and severe time constraints. Leaders are not required to face these 
decisions alone. Advisors and the mechanisms through which advice is offered to 
executive decision makers is an essential component of leadership in addressing an 
evolving crisis. 
This thesis explores an often underappreciated component of public leadership: 
the role of advisors in providing advice to executive decision makers in the homeland and 
national security domains. What factors influence the effectiveness of advice in homeland 
and national security? Through an examination of this question, the perspectives of 
academics and practitioners are identified and merged, drawing relevant conclusions and 
offering recommendations to benefit both leaders and advisors.  
First, an examination of current trends in social science literature is undertaken. 
This review explores why advice matters, the cognitive process for making decisions, the 
evolution of advice for public leaders, and a brief examination of contemporary crisis 
situations. Second, this thesis examines the viewpoints and experiences of prominent 
leaders holding homeland and national security responsibilities. A case study 
methodology is employed using a textual analysis of three published autobiographical 
memoirs as data. The case studies examine United States presidential cabinet-level 
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individuals who both receive advice as a leader in a governmental organization and offer 
advice to a chief executive.   
The first case study focuses on former secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge 
and his 2009 publication The Test of Our Times: America Under Siege… And How We 
Can Be Safe Again.1 The second case study centers on former secretary of Defense 
Robert M. Gates and his 2014 publication Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War.2 The 
third case study examines former secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and her 2015 
publication Hard Choices.3  
From the academic perspective, the following conclusions are identified: 
• Leaders need advisors. Advisors can help public leaders think through 
complexity and assist in both recognizing and mitigating the influence of 
bias and heuristics.  
• Advice literature is leader-centric and not advisor-centric. This literature 
review recognizes that while there is ample guidance about the advice 
process available with a focus on the leader, there is less written about the 
advice process with a focus on the advisor. 
• An understanding of crisis is critical for advisors in the homeland security 
and national security domains. Advisors who understand the evolution of 
crisis will benefit from a comprehension of the critical tasks associated 
with managing crisis. 
Based on an analysis of the case studies, the following conclusions are identified 
as significant factors impacting the effectiveness of advisors: 
• Strong trust relationships: The analysis demonstrates that all three case 
studies indicate trust relationships between chief executives and advisors 
are key components of effectiveness. 
• Observation and adaptation to the chief executive: Examples in the case 
studies demonstrate the importance of learning the preferences of the chief 
executive and understanding how to interact and appeal to their particular 
style for absorbing information. 
                                                 
1 Tom Ridge and Larry Bloom, The Test of Our Times: America Under Siege… And How We Can Be 
Safe Again (New York: Thomas Dunne, 2009). 
2 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014). 
3 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014). 
 xiii 
• Candid and straightforward advice: Frank and honest advice was evident 
as a significant factor in all three case studies. 
In addition to the conclusions offered, this thesis merges the findings of both 
academic literature and practitioner perspective to further distill actionable guidance to 
benefit advisors and the public they serve. Recommendations are offered for advisors and 
public leaders, and a final recommendation is offered to benefit both advisors and 
leaders. 
Recommendations for advisors include the following: 
Recommendation 1: Advisors should strive for, value, and actively maintain a 
relationship of mutual trust with the leaders they support and advisors with whom they 
interact.  
Recommendation 2: Advisors should observe and adapt to the chief executive 
and the environmental conditions in which they exist.  
Recommendation 3: Advisors should understand, appreciate, and practice the 
nuances of candidate, frank and straightforward advice.  
Recommendations for public leaders working with advisors include the following: 
Recommendation 1: Public leaders should establish and cultivate a culture of 
advice.  
Recommendation 2: Public leaders should cultivate a stronger understanding of 
crisis decision-making and the role advisors play in offering guidance.  
Recommendation for both advisors and public leaders include the following: 
Recommendation 1: Both advisors and public leaders should embrace the role of 
an advisor as a choice architect.  
This thesis provides a small contribution to a growing dialog about the role of 
advisors who support public leaders. While by no means all-inclusive, the findings and 
recommendations offered seek to further enhance this working relationship and have 
broad applicability across all levels of government. Ultimately, this exploration aims to 
 xiv 
better prepare future leaders and advisors to both understand and appreciate the factors 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. INHERENT CHALLENGES OF DECISION MAKING 
The murmur of the audience gradually descends into silence as the black tie gala’s 
program commences. Hundreds of well-dressed guests take their seats at tables with 
elegant, formal place settings. It is a full house. The chief executive, one of many 
dignitaries and celebrities in attendance, is seated at the dais on a stage adjacent to the 
night’s other scheduled speakers. Unbeknownst to the hundreds of guests awaiting the 
evening’s entertainment, something pivotal has happened. One of the most substantial 
decisions during the chief executive’s leadership has just been set in motion. The decision 
could affect the safety and security of all in attendance.  
The chief executive’s decision followed weeks of analysis with a team of 
advisors, in the face of ballooning pressure and limited intelligence. While it may sound 
extraordinary, it is a scenario that any leader charged with public safety and national 
security responsibilities could face. 
In this particular instance, the high-stakes scenario became one of the most 
significant homeland and national security events in recent years. It happened April 30, 
2011. President Barack Obama was attending the annual White House Correspondents 
Association annual dinner.1 The president had given approval to conduct a secret raid 
that would result in the death of America’s number one terrorist target, Osama bin 
Laden.2 
While it is often hard to draw comparisons between the level of decision making 
that takes place in a White House Situation Room and the more routine decisions faced 
by thousands of other public leaders at various levels of government each day, it is 
important to note that commonalities do exist. Chief executives at all levels are faced 
                                                 
1 C-SPAN, “2011 White House Correspondents’ Dinner,” April 20, 2011, https://www.c-
span.org/video/?299256-1/2011-white-house-correspondents-dinner. 
2 John A. Gans Jr, “‘This Is 50-50’: Behind Obama’s Decision to Kill Bin Laden,” The Atlantic, 
October 10, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/10/this-is-50-50-behind-obamas-
decision-to-kill-bin-laden/263449/. 
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with the responsibility and ownership for decisions made within their sphere of 
responsibility, and the choices they make may have significant and far-reaching impacts 
and potential consequences. Yet leaders do not often make these difficult decisions alone; 
they rely on the advice of others to make sense of information, examine potential 
outcomes, and arrive at a final determination. In the time since that particular night in 
April 2011, journalists, academics and historians have reviewed the advice offered to 
President Obama as he approved Operation Neptune Spear, authorizing a military action 
that resulted in the death of bin Laden. What has become apparent from an examination 
of this event is that President Obama was surrounded by a group of key advisors that 
provided guidance leading to his decision to take action. 
Situations like this one provide a better understanding of presidential decision 
making. Political science scholars, presidential authorities, and leadership experts will 
continue to evaluate the chief executive’s choices and how he arrived at his conclusion. 
Beyond an examination of the policy implications and intelligence gathering that 
supported President Obama’s decision, there is another opportunity for analysis. It is a 
central aspect of the decision-making process that receives significantly less attention yet 
is experienced by leaders at all levels of responsibility: the process of giving and 
receiving advice under extraordinary pressure. 
This thesis suggests that homeland security and national security events of the 
21st century require a fresh look at the important and often-ignored facet of leadership 
that can be simply referred to as advice. To begin this dialog and study its role in 
contemporary public leadership, an evaluative examination of case studies is used to open 
this conversation. There is good precedent for examining case studies in other academic 
fields from which to derive leadership lessons. For example, researcher Jim Collins, well-
known works such as Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies and Good 
to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap … And Others Don’t, evaluates cases of 
leaders who found the right mix of characteristics to succeed when others did not.3 Other 
                                                 
3 James C. Collins, Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap ... and Others Don't (New 
York: HarperBusiness, 2001); James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, Built to Last: Successful Habits of 
Visionary Companies (New York: HarperBusiness, 1997). 
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authors such as Walter Isaacson have embraced the case-study approach to retell the 
stories of significant thought leaders in the advancement of technology, as is the case in 
The Innovators: How a Group of Inventors, Hackers, Geniuses, and Geeks Created the 
Digital Revolution.4 Students of military science look to David Cloud and Greg Jaffe’s 
The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States 
Army, which examines the strengths and challenges encountered by military leaders.5 
This thesis uses a similar approach, harnessing case study methodology to examine the 
process of giving and receiving advice for public leaders and identify commonalities. 
What this research offers—and what makes it unique—is not that it offers advice 
on the broad topic of leadership, but rather it examines advice as a central subject of 
study for its relationship to leaders, and those who support the leader. First, this thesis 
delves into current trends in social science research that may help guide leaders and 
advisors in understanding the advice process. Second, this thesis uses a case study 
methodology to examine source material written by and about individuals who hold 
significant levels of responsibility in U.S. homeland and national security affairs to 
understand the viewpoint of practitioners who both receive advice and offer it to a chief 
executive. What makes each case study valuable is that these individuals serve a dual 
responsibility as the chief executive of a cabinet-level department and a senior advisor to 
a president, responsible for a specific area of expertise in the homeland and national 
security space. Each case study is examined on three specific dimensions: philosophies 
on advice, the characteristics of those who offer advice, and views or experiences on 
giving or receiving advice in an evolving crisis. From this examination, an analysis of the 
advisors’ perspectives on counsel is distilled. Ultimately, this thesis blends the current 
understandings in social science with the observations of homeland and national security 
leaders to offer a new perspective on the process of giving and receiving advice for 
public leadership.  
                                                 
4 Walter Isaacson, The Innovators (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014). 
5 David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of 
the United States Army (New York: Crown, 2009). 
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B. WHY HOMELAND SECURITY MATTERS  
The establishment of the homeland security enterprise within the United States 
created new challenges for executive decision makers at the federal, state and local levels 
of government. As described by Nadav Morag,  
the subsequent inability to deal with large-scale disasters, such as that 
produced by Hurricane Katrina in late August of 2005, led to a broadening 
of the definition of homeland security to include large significant 
disasters, major public health emergencies, and other large-scale events 
that had the potential to endanger the citizenry, economy, rule of law, and 
the general functioning of government and society.6  
With this expansion, comes increased complexity and interdependency among the 
systems that mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from catastrophic events or 
threats. Simply put: organizational leadership in this evolving environment demands a 
strategic approach and the appropriate support to manage such complexity. Advisors 
provide that support, and this explores how those advisors succeed. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
At the center of the expansive homeland security enterprise is an intersection of 
competing priorities and differing strategies to achieve a mission that is both broad and 
dynamic. In the second decade of the 21st century, matters of homeland security and 
national security seemingly grow closer to one another, as transnational threats abroad 
increasingly influence events at home. Within this complex homeland security and 
national security environment, executive decision makers face a daunting burden to make 
decisions. In the face of growing attention and scrutiny by the public, government 
executives must embrace their responsibilities as competent administrators, thoughtful 
policy makers and sensitive stewards of public trust and monies, while also remaining 
constantly vigilant and ready to address the next crisis. Executive decision makers 
shoulder this potentially overwhelming responsibility; however, they must not do so 
alone and in a vacuum, devoid of subject matter expertise and appropriate guidance. 
                                                 
6 Nadav Morag, “Does Homeland Security Exist Outside the United States?,” Homeland Security 
Affairs, 7 (September 2011): 1. 
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Advice and the mechanisms in which executive decision makers obtain and receive 
advice play pivotal roles in the management of complex situations.  
In the post-9/11 era, there is an increasing body of crisis leadership literature to 
help guide leaders. Yet the role of those who provide advice in support of the leader, 
otherwise known as an advisor, is broad and often underexplored, particularly in 
contemporary examinations of the evolving homeland security space. Executive decision 
makers, whether he or she holds the office of mayor, governor or president of the United 
States, rely on formal and informal advisory arrangements to serve a number of 
functions.7 Senior managers in government agencies, non-governmental organizations, or 
private sector corporations are both advisors and decision-makers. Emerging leaders in 
the homeland security and national security space must understand the need for expert 
counsel, particularly in the face of unfolding crisis events. This thesis evaluates the 
experiences of high-ranking practitioners with the viewpoints of academics in social 
science to derive a better understanding of what leads to effective advisors.  
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What factors influence the effectiveness of advisors in homeland security 
and national security? 
This thesis consists of two research areas. The first is the analysis of social 
science research surrounding advice, particularly in the face of an evolving crisis. 
Second, this thesis examines case studies of prominent leaders with homeland security 
and national security responsibilities to scrutinize their experiences and perspectives as 
decision-makers who both receive advice and provide it to a chief executive. The thesis 
identifies the characteristics of giving and receiving advice as suggested in modern social 
science research and then cross references these characteristics with the experiences of 
practitioners. Ultimately, this exploration, particularly as it relates to crisis, aims to better 
prepare future leaders and advisors to understand and appreciate the factors that lead to 
effectiveness in giving and receiving advice.  
                                                 
7 Julia Fleischer, “Policy Advice and Institutional Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Germany and 
Britain,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Potsdam, 2012, 3.  
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Studying the advice process is not a new idea. There is ample literature that 
scrutinizes the role of advice with a focus on the client, such as the president of the 
United States. There is also abundant literature in the historical context regarding advice 
and the formal bureaucratic structures that provide advice within institutions. This thesis 
explores the qualitative aspects of advice from the perspective of the advisors, 
particularly in the face of crisis circumstances.  
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research uses academic and practitioner perspectives on the advice process 
supporting public leaders, otherwise referred to as executive decision makers. First, an 
examination of relevant academic literature explores why advice matters and how 
individuals make decisions. This analysis includes trends in cognition, the evolution of 
advice for public leaders, and a brief examination of contemporary crisis. Second, this 
thesis conducts a textual analysis of three case studies, written by homeland and national 
security cabinet-level officials. From these case studies, factors associated with 
effectiveness are identified through three dimensions: the philosophy and approach to the 
advice process, the people and key characteristics valued in advisors, and the advice 
processes used in addressing crisis. The perspectives of academics and practitioners are 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To better understand the relationship between advisors and executive decision 
makers, this thesis explores relevant literature in the fields of psychology, social science, 
political science, and public administration as they relate to the advice process. The 
literature traverses four seemingly disparate areas of study; however, this thesis argues 
that each concept is foundational to understanding the advice process in a homeland and 
national security domain. First, the literature review explores why advice matters and the 
impact of escalating complexity. Second, an examination of current trends in cognitive 
understanding is explored in order to better understand how individuals make decisions. 
Third, the evolution of advice for public leaders is considered in both a historical and 
contemporary lens. Fourth, a brief examination of current thinking related to crisis is 
offered.  
A. WHY ADVICE MATTERS 
Many academics see the world we live in today as one of escalating complexity. 
As described by David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, advanced technology, 
globalization, intricate markets, and cultural changes are just a few factors contributing to 
the growing emphasis on complexity science and comprehension of complex systems.8 
As Snowden and Boone describe, complex systems involve numerous elements 
interacting in non-linear ways, when minor changes produce disproportionately 
significant consequences.9 While an understanding of complexity science is rooted in the 
business management lexicon, it is relevant to public sector leaders. Complex systems 
describe the organizations—and often the environment—in which public leaders make 
decisions in the homeland security and national security space. For example, decisions 
about information sharing or response capacity can cause ripple effects within the 
systems that analyze and disseminate information or coordinate and manage various 
response resources.  
                                                 
8 David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard 
Business Review (November 2007): 1–9. 
9 Ibid. 
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Beyond recognizing increases in complexity, decision-makers must also 
understand the risks associated with such complexity and their impact to decision 
making. Author Rebecca Costa argues that history is full of examples when the 
complexity of issues faced by society grows so large that humans fail to think their way 
out of those problems.10 As she describes, “the uneven rate of change between slow 
evolution of human biology and the rapid rate at which societies advance naturally causes 
progress to come to a standstill.”11 She contends that humans reach a particular point 
when problems exceed their ability to adequately analyze information, to effectively plan 
and innovate to solve these complex challenges. She describes the cognitive threshold, a 
point at which society and/or people will not think their way out of the problems they 
face.12 While her description of cognitive threshold refers to society as a whole, her 
explanation captures a concept relevant to individuals: the idea that decision-makers may 
lack the capacity to address complex problems alone.  
B. HOW LEADERS MAKE DECISIONS 
Before one can examine the advice process supporting executive decision makers, 
one must examine the process of how individuals make decisions, the cognitive system 
that supports decision making and the systematic bias that influences thinking.13 
Psychologists Keith Stanovich and Richard West first proposed the concept that thinking 
occurs in two systems.14 Daniel Kahneman’s work focuses on how these two systems 
affect an individual’s ability to make decisions.15 The automatic system, described as 
“System 1,” operates with limited or no sense of voluntary control. The reflective system, 
often called “System 2,” requires concentration and allocates attention to demanding and 
                                                 
10 Rebecca D. Costa, The Watchman’s Rattle: A Radical New Theory of Collapse (Philadelphia: 
Vanguard, 2010), 7. 
11 Costa, The Watchman’s Rattle, 6. 
12Ibid., 7. 
13 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness (New York: Penguin, 2009), 19. 
14 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 20. 
15 Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 20. 
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deliberate problem solving.16 Together, these systems unconsciously drive our ability to 
analyze information and make conscious determinations. 
Based on the work of Kahneman and Amos Tversky, psychologists now have a 
deeper understanding of human judgment and the various heuristics and biases that exist 
between the two systems.17 Among the most recognized biases are anchoring, availability 
heuristic, representativeness, unrealistic optimism, loss aversion, status quo bias and 
framing.18 Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein argue these heuristics demonstrate the use 
of seemingly sensible rules that can unknowingly influence decision-makers. Biases, 
often viewed by the individual as a simple rule of thumb, also demonstrate a glimpse of 
“busy people trying to cope in a complex world in which they cannot afford to think 
deeply about every choice they have to make.”19 While these biases are subconscious and 
unavoidable, they cannot serve as a crutch to explain away quick, uninformed or poor 
decision making, particularly in the midst of the types of crisis public leaders face.  
It is unreasonable to assume that any decision-maker will recognize the error of 
their own thinking when unsuspectingly and unfairly influenced by the previously 
identified heuristics. Yet leaders in homeland security and national security organizations 
do not have the luxury of risking flawed decision making. It is imperative that public 
leaders avoid falling victim to such bias, and therefore, minimize the risk exposure to 
unsound decision making. 
While it is nearly impossible to completely eradicate the influence of biases and 
heuristics as described by Kahneman, leaders can take steps to reduce the risk of these 
subconscious influences while also increasing their capacity to manage complex 
problems. As Thaler and Sunstein describe, “Drawing on some well-established findings 
in social science, we show that in many cases, individuals make pretty bad decisions—
decisions they would not have made if they had paid full attention and possessed 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 20–21. 
17 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 23; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. “Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Science 185 (1974): 1124–1131. 
18 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 22–39. 
19 Ibid., 37. 
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complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and complete self-control.”20 Thaler 
and Sunstein promote a concept they call choice architecture, and they go on to explain 
that a choice architect “has the responsibility for organizing the context in which people 
make decisions.”21 By this definition, this thesis argues that advisors who surround and 
support executive decision makers also serve as choice architects, responsible for 
providing context and organizing information for consumption by the executive decision 
maker.  
The involvement of advisors also satisfies the recommendations of Costa, who 
explains recent research shows that superior solutions to difficult problems come from 
work in small groups, as opposed to the work of individuals (i.e., a leader making a 
decision alone). She advocates that “solutions to large, complex problems demand a 
convergence of many different areas of expertise” and that “no one person possesses 
enough talent in enough disciplines to tackle today’s systemic problems.”22 Advisors not 
only help to filter a leader’s bias, but also exist to provide crucial input to addressing 
complex problems. 
Some critics argue that advisors as choice architects unduly influence the 
decisions of the leaders they support. An opponent might suggest that such organizing of 
context amounts to manipulation and restricts the freedom of choice owed to the leader. 
However, Thaler and Sunstein refute this position, arguing it is not possible to avoid 
influencing people’s decisions. Quite simply, there is “no such thing as neutral design.”23 
Research conducted by Jennifer Lerner et al. highlights the unavoidable emotional bias 
that can unknowingly steer decision making, though their conclusions also support the 
use of choice architecture as a means to counter the unintended emotional response to 
decision making.24 Research suggests that a reliance on others as a sounding board for 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 5. 
21 Ibid., 3. 
22 Costa, The Watchman’s Rattle, 231. 
23 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 3. 
24 Jennifer S. Lerner et al., “Emotion and Decision Making,” Annual Review of Psychology 66, no. 1 
(2015): 813–814, doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115043. 
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ideas helps to limit the impact of emotional bias, further supporting the need for advisory 
arrangements to facilitate decision making.25 
C. THE EVOLUTION OF ADVICE FOR PUBLIC LEADERS 
The literature on advice to leaders in government is extensive and as old as the 
existence of government itself. As David Weimer describes, “from Confucius to Niccolo 
Machiavelli, to numerous practitioners and scholars in more modern times, many have 
recognized that leaders, however intelligent, energetic, and powerful, must rely on 
advisors to govern effectively.”26 Axioms and maxims about advice to rulers can be 
found throughout the study of political history and philosophy dating back to the Greek 
and Roman rulers. Yet the work of Machiavelli distinguishes itself from the governance 
advice of antiquity, previously built to support the idea of utopian societies and the 
virtuous connection between rulers, politics and ethical behavior.27 Machiavelli’s work 
introduced realism, teaching of the different values in dealings between states versus 
one’s fellow citizens.28 Regardless of how academics interpret the advice offered in 
Machiavelli’s most notable works The Prince and The Discourses on the First Ten Books 
of Titus Livy, his contributions highlight a shift in how advice regarding governance is 
given.29 Rather than writing in terms of honorable and righteous pursuits in politics, 
Machiavelli’s works take on a pragmatic role for advice-giving, whether or not such a 
result was his original intent. Since then, academics have focused much attention on the 
challenges of offering advice to leaders when such input is unwanted or less than 
desirable, often referred to as “speaking truth to power.”30  
                                                 
25 Shankar Vedantam, “How Emotional Responses to Terrorism Shape Attitudes Toward Policies,” 
NPR, December 22, 2015, http://www.npr.org/2015/12/22/460656763/how-emotional-responses-to-
terrorism-shape-attitudes-toward-policies. 
26 David L. Weimer, “Book Reviews,” review of Rules for Rulers: The Politics of Advice, by Arnold 
J. Meltsner, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 10, no. 1 (1991): 117–118. 
27 Robert P. Harrison, “What Can You Learn from Machiavelli?” Yale Insights, January 1, 2011. 
28 Niccolo Machiavelli, Introduction to The Prince, ed. and trans. David Wootton (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1995), xxii. 
29 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, and The Discourses (New York: Modern Library, 1950). 
30 Paul ’t Hart, Karen Tindall, and Christer Brown, “Crisis Leadership of the Bush Presidency: 
Advisory Capacity and Presidential Performance in the Acute Stages of the 9/11 and Katrina Crises,” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 39, no. 3 (2009): 476. 
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The modern era of advice literature has evolved since the time of Machiavelli to 
include numerous works focused on leadership and advice-giving for good governance. 
Many academics praise the work of Max Weber in developing a modern model for 
bureaucratic structure.31 His writings explore ideal characteristics associated with 
emerging bureaucracies, from the mundane to the novel.32 His turn-of-the-century work 
is largely credited with providing guiding principles familiar within today’s bureaucratic 
structures, which are key fixtures of mechanisms that produce advice to decision-makers. 
The functions such as division of labor, hierarchical structures and professional staff 
within the modern bureaucracy are central components of advising executives in 
government today.33 
In Rules for Rulers: The Politics of Advice, Arnold Meltsner advances a simple 
presentation of rules that he believes are central to leaders as they select advisors, absorb 
the advice given and react to it.34 Meltsner’s work has broad applicability for anyone in a 
leadership role, given that “the leader of all but the smallest organization is intimately 
involved with a team of advisors.”35 In addition to rules for selecting advisors, Meltsner 
also discusses the potential unpleasantness of firing advisors who do not serve the 
executive’s (or in Meltsner’s words, “ruler’s”) best interest, as he urges rulers to 
overcome the thorny topic and remove those that are disloyal or inept.36 Meltsner’s work 
is highly regarded for its readability and frankness with which it dispenses the suggested 
rules.37 Meltsner also encourages rulers to exercise self-awareness and self-control in 
                                                 
31 James P. Pfiffner, “Presidential Decision Making: Rationality, Advisory Systems, and Personality,” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 219. 
32 Max Weber, “Bureaucracy,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds. H. H. Gerth and C. 
Wright Mills. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 196–244. 
https://archive.org/details/frommaxweberessa00webe. 
33 Pfiffner, “Presidential Decision Making,” 219. 
34 Arnold J. Meltsner, Rules for Rulers: The Politics of Advice (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1990). 
35 Marc Landy, “Book Reviews: American Politics,” review of Rules for Rulers: The Politics of 
Advice,” by Arnold J. Meltsner, The American Political Science Review 85 (1991): 295–296. 
36 Landy, “Book Reviews: American Politics,” 296. 
37 Weimer, “Book Reviews,” 118. 
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receiving advice.38 He recommends that receiving advice means rulers engage in 
“calibration” and therefore consider the advice given in the context of its accuracy, 
timeliness, appropriateness and robustness.39 This guidance helps rulers assess the advice 
instead of reacting to feelings or opinions regarding the advisor offering the advice.40 
Meltsner’s contribution is practical and simple in its application, providing public 
leadership with modern-day guidance to augment the more brash Machiavellian insights 
from several centuries earlier. 
The most recent writings on advice within the academic domain of public 
administration are often focused on the bureaucratic and institutional channels that 
formulate policy decisions.41 Julia Fleischer provides a detailed accounting of social 
science literature for what is commonly referred to within the political science discipline 
as “advisory arrangements.” As she describes, such arrangements account for policy 
advice to executive actors inside of a central government.42 These arrangements describe 
channels that offer advice to political executives separate from, and often in competition 
with, the policy advice offered through the traditional bureaucratic process. As she 
further explains, “these advisory arrangements range from full-fledged line divisions for 
planning or general affairs to ministerial cabinets and advisory staffs at the organisational 
top-level of ministries, informal circles of personal aides as ‘kitchen cabinets,’ and 
individual special advisors.”43 Her work demonstrates a detailed accounting of key social 
science studies conducted on the policy advice in government policy-making across both 
parliamentary systems and presidential systems of government as recent as 2012, when 
her paper was published.44 She rightfully notes that only limited research is available 
                                                 
38 Landy, “Book Reviews: American Politics,” 296.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Hart, Tindall, and Brown, “Crisis Leadership of the Bush Presidency,” 476. 
42 Fleischer, “Policy Advice and Institutional Politics,” 3.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Fleischer, “Policy Advice and Institutional Politics,” 5. 
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regarding the influence of advisory arrangements and their interactions with ministerial 
bureaucracy, as most studies are focused on the client (executive).45  
An example of a study focused on how advisory arrangements serve the specific 
needs of the client (or chief executive) is James Pfiffner’s review of presidential decision 
making. Pfiffner offers a fairly comprehensive review of research into decision-making 
theory and the advisory systems supporting the president. As Pfiffner explains about 
advisory systems, “the assumption is that no one individual can hope to understand all of 
the ramifications of decisions facing the president and that staff structures are thus 
necessary but can help or hinder good decision making.”46 He goes on to provide insight 
regarding the advisory arrangements utilized by various U.S. presidents, including 
formalistic, competitive and collegial arrangements.47 He further discusses the small 
group dynamics and different roles played by staff in support of the presidential decision 
making, from devil’s advocate to neutral broker.48 As Fleischer notes, the work of many 
presidential scholars, including Pfiffner, is built around the president and his specific 
preferences. This research leaves open the opportunity to better understand the dynamics 
associated with the advisor and how they perceive their role within the advisory 
arrangement. 
D. UNDERSTANDING CRISIS 
The disciplines of homeland security and national security share many areas of 
overlap; chief among them is their relationship to addressing evolving crises. Recent 
work on the subject of crisis leadership in political systems has advanced new approaches 
to strategic management of crisis events for governmental executives. While no singular 
academic definition exists for defining a crisis, one commonly cited description defines 
crisis as “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a 
social system, which—under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances—
                                                 
45 Ibid, 4. 
46 Pfiffner, “Presidential Decision Making,” 218. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid, 219–220. 
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necessitates making critical decisions.”49 Arjen Boin et al. identified five critical tasks 
central to public leaders’ ability to manage crisis,50 which are quoted as follows: 
• Sense making: Policy makers must recognize from vague, ambivalent, 
and contradictory signals that something out of the ordinary is 
developing.51 
• Decision making: Crises leave governments and public agencies with 
pressing issues to be addressed… Crises force governments and leaders to 
confront issues they do not face on a daily basis.52 
• Meaning making: When they (leaders) have made sense of the events and 
have arrived at some sort of situational appraisal and made strategic policy 
choices, leaders must get others to accept their definition of the situation. 
They must impute ‘meaning’ to the unfolding crisis in such a way that 
their efforts to manage it are enhanced.53 
• Terminating: Crisis termination is twofold. It is about shifting back from 
emergency to routine. At the strategic level, it also requires rendering 
account for what has happened and gaining acceptance for this account.54 
• Learning: Political and organizational lesson drawing.55 
From a psychological perspective, each of the five tasks associated with crisis 
presents a potentially overwhelming circumstance that must be navigated by a public 
leader, exposing the leader to the previously discussed risk of cognitive threshold. Boin 
and his colleagues argue that crisis often marks a phase of disorder, when policy makers 
experience “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms 
of a system, which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates 
making vital decisions.”56 Many would agree that homeland security organizations are 
                                                 
49 Uriel Rosenthal, Michael T. Charles and Paul ‘t Hart, “The World of Crises and Crisis 
Management” In Coping with Crises: The Management of Disasters, Riots, and Terrorism, ed. Uriel 
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50 Arjen Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership under Public Pressure 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 10. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Boin et.al., The Politics of Crisis Management, 11. 
53 Ibid., 13. 
54 Ibid., 14. 
55 Ibid., 14. 
56 Ibid., 2. 
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responsible for decision making in the midst of the disorder described by Boin et al. Such 
crisis circumstances are not new to the 21st century, yet Boin and his colleagues argue 
the more nuanced understanding of contemporary crisis “emphasizes the unintended 
consequences of increased complexity.”57 They claim that crisis consists of three 
common components: threat, uncertainty and urgency.58 Each of these components 
contributes to the impossible conditions in which leaders must make decisions.59 While 
crises are not unique to the increasingly complex environment in which we function 
today, they expose organizations and leaders to new problems, such as unintended 
consequences of their decisions. Boin and his colleagues point out leaders at the strategic 
level of organizations rarely experience the extreme urgency they may face in crisis, thus 
compressing even further the time horizon for decision making.60 These factors further 
support the notion that complex problems, particularly those exacerbated by crisis 
circumstances like the various situations faced by homeland security and national 
security leaders, create circumstances and pressures that may very well exceed the 
cognitive threshold of decision-makers.  
Each of the four previous areas contributes to a better understanding of the advice 
process for public leaders. First, those that give and/or receive advice should understand 
why advice for public leaders is important—and possibly more important today than ever 
before. Increases in complexity make problem solving exponentially more difficult, 
creating a potential for a cascade of unintended consequences with each decision a public 
leader must make. The risk of cognitive threshold can impede a public leader’s ability to 
navigate difficult decisions alone. Second, advisors and public leaders must understand 
the cognitive science of how individuals make decisions. Furthermore, they must also 
acknowledge the potential risks associated with hidden bias. Advisors play a role in 
identifying, recognizing and mitigating the risks inherent to subconsciously relying on 
heuristics. Third, advisors and public leaders benefit from an understanding of how the 
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advice process for public leaders has evolved over time. It is valuable to note that much 
of the contemporary literature is structural in nature, focused on the advisory 
arrangements and channels that support leaders within bureaucratic institutions. This 
examination highlights an existing opportunity to move away from a client-specific focus 
on advice and move toward a better understanding of the characteristics associated with 
those providing advice. Finally, this literature review explored current thinking in the 
understanding of crisis. Decision making under the constraints and pressures of a crisis 
circumstance may be infrequent and even rare in other industries, but public leaders in 
the homeland and national security domains are exposed to potential crisis circumstances 
often. An understanding of crisis and the ability to work under the constraints of a crisis 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN—A PRACTITIONER PERSPECTIVE 
The research design for this thesis consists of a case study method employing a 
textual analysis of existing published autobiographical memoirs as the data. In the 
literature review, an understanding of social science theory is used to examine scholarly 
research related to advising decision-makers. The research design seeks to assess the 
factors identified by practitioners in three case studies. The case studies involve United 
States government cabinet-level homeland and national security officials that recently 
published memoirs of their experiences during their time in office.  
A. DISCUSSION OF CASE STUDIES 
Through an examination of case studies, this thesis seeks to identify the factors 
that contribute to effectiveness in receiving and/or offering advice, with a particular 
emphasis on advice during crisis. The factors will be derived from the individuals in each 
case study, using their own experiences in their own words. Recently published memoirs 
will serve as the autobiographical data for each case study. While effectiveness is an 
undefined descriptor, the research uses the opinions and reflections within the case study 
and the context provided to determine if the factor is recognized as contributing to 
effectiveness and/or success in the eyes of the subject. 
The case studies selected for this thesis are as follows: 
Case Study 1: Tom Ridge and his 2009 publication The Test of Our Times: 
America Under Siege… And How We Can Be Safe Again.61 Two former secretaries of 
Homeland Security published writings in the year 2009 (Secretary Ridge and Secretary 
Michael Chertoff).62 They represent the most recent publications from a former secretary 
of Homeland Security at the time of this thesis. However, Secretary Ridge’s memoir is 
selected for this case study over Secretary Chertoff’s work because Ridge’s publication is 
                                                 
61 Tom Ridge and Larry Bloom, The Test of Our Times: America under Siege… And How We Can Be 
Safe Again (New York: Thomas Dunne, 2009), 6–130. 
62 Michael Chertoff, Homeland Security: Assessing the First Five Years (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009). 
 20 
regarded as offering more personal insight, while Chertoff’s book is a reflection of the 
policy substance associated with homeland security.63 Ridge also offers unique 
perspective relative to both homeland and national security, having served as the first 
Homeland Security advisor and secretary of Homeland Security. Ridge served in a 
Republican presidential administration. He previously held elected offices as Governor of 
Pennsylvania and a member of the U.S. House of Representatives. 
Case Study 2: Robert M. Gates and his 2014 publication Duty: Memoirs of a 
Secretary at War.64 Secretary Gates has served in a variety of national security roles, 
including as secretary of defense, director of national intelligence, deputy national 
security advisor and deputy director of central intelligence. His writing represents one of 
two recently published memoirs of a defense secretary. Leon Panetta’s Worthy Fights: a 
Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace was published in the fall of 2014, but Gates 
work is selected for this analysis.65 Having served both a Republican and Democratic 
president, Gates is selected for this case study over Panetta, providing balance against the 
other two case studies. Gates is also the author of the 2016 A Passion for Leadership: 
Lessons on Change and Reform from Fifty Years of Public Service.66 While the subject of 
Gates’ more recent writing provides insight to many of the same topics examined in this 
thesis, Duty is selected based on its format as a traditional memoir specifically focused on 
his time as secretary. 
Case Study 3: Hillary Rodham Clinton and her 2015 publication Hard Choices.67 
This represents the most recent publication by a former secretary of state at the time of 
this project. Secretary Clinton’s memoir provides insight into a variety of contemporary 
                                                 
63 Stephanie Blum, “Same Priorities, Different Perspectives: Tom Ridge and Michael Chertoff on 
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foreign affairs challenges and potential crises. Secretary Clinton previously served as a 
U.S. senator and as first lady of the United States.  
Cabinet-level officials are selected for these case studies as they arguably 
represent the highest level of advisor in the bureaucratic structure of the U.S. federal 
government. Cabinet-level officials both give advice to the chief executive and also 
receive advice from a robust apparatus of lower-tier advisory arrangements. They are 
well positioned to offer insight into the advisory process, given their dual roles as 
advisors and public leaders. They also represent a segment of government leadership for 
which recent autobiographical information is more readily available. The intent is to use 
recent memoirs to represent a modern view of how advice is given and received in the 
face of the complex challenges evolving in the 21st century.  
B. DISCUSSION OF ANALYSIS 
The research is designed to compare the factors identified by practitioners through 
the case studies against the recommendations found within the academic literature. The 
analysis shall derive the key factors influencing the effectiveness of the advice process 
observed from practical experience. This guidance serves two purposes:  
1. Advisors currently working in an advisory capacity to an executive would 
benefit from using this framework to inform better practices for 
performing their advisory functions, and  
2. Public leaders serving in executive decision making roles can better 
understand factors to help in the selection of their own advisory teams.  
C. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
The focus of this research centers on the U.S. federal government system and the 
cabinet officials that support the president, as opposed to local or state government in the 
United States or parliamentary systems of governance outside of the United States. This 
is due, in part, to the availability of data and the ubiquity of issues faced at this level of 
homeland and national security. However, as Paul ‘t Hart, Karen Tindall and Christer 
Brown acknowledge, “the general concepts and conclusions regarding advisory 
configurations have relevance across other executive systems and are interesting areas for 
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further research.”68 The analysis provided in this thesis seeks to have broad applicability 
for advisors and leaders at any level of government, regardless of the issues being 
addressed within the case studies.  
The number of case studies used in this review was determined as a reasonable 
amount of source data to provide a diverse cross-section for comparison. The selected 
case studies represent participation in both post 9/11 presidential administrations and 
represent political parties as well as genders. The case studies were selected among the 
most recent publications of memoirs for each particular cabinet position. Memoirs were 
determined as the best opportunity to analyze the perspectives and insights of advisors in 
their own words, recognizing that a vulnerability of this approach is the potentially overly 
polished, guarded or heavily edited nature of such commentary. Cabinet officials were 
identified based on their bureaucratic responsibility as both an executive within a 
functional apparatus of government, but also a senior advisor to the chief executive of the 
United States. The case studies are limited to cabinet appointees and do not explore other 
positions within the homeland security or national security apparatus, although 
Secretaries Ridge and Gates previously served in those roles and draw upon those 
perspectives and experiences within their writings. 
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IV. CASE STUDY 1: TOM RIDGE, FORMER SECRETARY OF 
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
The first case study is the memoir written by Tom Ridge with Larry Bloom titled 
The Test of Our Times: America Under Siege… and How We Can Be Safe Again.69 This 
text represents the first and only memoir written by Ridge as of this writing, as he reflects 
on his role in shaping the homeland security landscape in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks. Ridge, who previously served as governor of Pennsylvania before accepting 
President George W. Bush’s offer to serve as the first director of the Office of Homeland 
Security, was appointed as the first secretary of Homeland Security when the department 
was formally established in 2003.70 Ridge’s book recounts in detail the experiences that 
shaped his views, transitioning from his role as a chief executive in state government and 
into a responsibility that served as a key driver in advising the president on a new strategy 
to protect against threats to the United States at home. The Ridge memoir provides a 
helpful canvass to delve deeper into the role of advice in the emerging discipline that has 
come to be known as homeland security.  
Three notable dimensions are examined regarding Ridge’s approach to the advice 
process. First, Ridge’s view of the advice process can be viewed through his philosophy 
and approach to dealing with advice. Second, Ridge’s experience can be explored based 
on the advisors upon whom he relied to support him. Third, Ridge’s role in the advice 
process can be examined through the lens of the advice he offers a chief executive in 
facing an evolving crisis.  
A. PHILOSOPHY AND APPROACH  
Ridge’s case study does not explicitly articulate his philosophy as it relates to 
advice, but an analysis of several different anecdotes provides meaningful clues to his 
viewpoint. To understand Ridge’s overall philosophy and approach to the advice process, 
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70 “Thomas J. Ridge, Homeland Security Secretary 2003–2005,” Department of Homeland Security, 
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particularly within the homeland security discipline, it is helpful to start with a brief 
examination of his personal introduction to this emerging enterprise. Ridge’s vantage 
point is shaped through both his own experience as a governor facing a terrorist event 
within his own state and through his decision to leave the Governor’s Office and become 
a senior advisor to the president. From this initial experience with addressing terrorism, 
Ridge gains a new appreciation for the role of advisors providing critical, timely 
information during an unfolding crisis. 
His reflections start on September 11 and how he, as a state chief executive, 
works to comprehend the developing events in both New York City and within the 
borders of his very own state. Ridge begins by describing his own personal experience, 
away from the commonwealth’s capitol that morning and back home in Erie for personal 
reasons.71 Ridge receives the startling news of the first plane crashing into the World 
Trade Center by way of a state trooper assigned to his protective detail. Ridge describes 
the confusion and lack of comprehension that both he and his Chief of Staff Mark 
Campbell share in a phone conversation, attempting to make sense of the bizarre and 
startling occurrences. He pronounces his desire to consume information by explaining, 
“I’ve never considered myself a control freak, but I always crave information. I learned 
another expression for it later—situational awareness.”72 This memorable moment for 
Ridge seems seminal in shaping his view on the importance of information sharing 
during an unfolding crisis. 
As Ridge describes his encounter with America’s most significant terrorist event, 
he provides additional explanation about how he, as a state’s chief executive, consumed 
information and attempted to comprehend its meaning. Ridge describes how his press 
secretary, Tim Reeves, first breaks the news that one of the hijacked planes had crashed 
in Pennsylvania.73 It is interesting to note the limitations he faced in comprehending this 
circumstance during the unfolding uncertainty. This experience goes on to shape Ridge’s 
viewpoint on the criticality of the information-sharing role in the advice process. With his 
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own advisory team back in Pennsylvania’s capitol city of Harrisburg, Ridge expresses 
frustration at the inadequate information he receives, given that he is stranded hundreds 
of miles away from the support staff and aides that typically surround a governor. His 
transportation is restricted due to the nationwide ground-stop issued by the Federal 
Aviation Administration and therefore Ridge waits two hours for a state police helicopter 
to be granted permission to transport the governor back to the state capitol. Recounting 
this story helps shape Ridge’s first-hand appreciation for the importance of timely 
information (or a lack thereof) and the necessity for a strong, ongoing and timely 
communication relationship to exist between an executive and his advisors, particularly 
in the face of uncertainty. 
Amid the confusion that would emerge in the aftermath of 9/11, Ridge describes 
the new path his career takes as he is selected by the White House to coordinate and 
advise the president about homeland security efforts. The Ridge memoir offers insight 
into his own selection to serve in a new advisory responsibility to President Bush. This 
particular discussion further illustrates a second aspect important to Ridge’s philosophy 
and approach to advice: trust and influence with the chief executive.  
Ridge describes receiving the call from the president and the difficulty deciding to 
leave his role as governor. This decision is made even more challenging as he knows he 
will be taking ownership as an advisor in an emerging subject area where success will be 
hard to measure. As he explains, Ridge’s own gubernatorial advisory staff seemed 
“incredulous, thinking I was making a big mistake.”74 They candidly express their 
concerns that such a position would come with little power but significant political risks. 
However, the president’s pledge to Ridge is that this new position offers an effective 
footprint to influence decisions in the White House. He describes the assurance that this 
advisory role would maintain significant influence as the president pledged: “Your office 
will be right next to mine, and there will be complete access to me.”75 Ultimately, Ridge 
is compelled to accept this position based on these commitments, despite the uncertainty 
and warnings of his trusted staff. He joins the ranks of the president’s senior advisory 
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team under the premise that his new role would have the necessary advisory influence in 
shaping significant homeland security decisions. Ridge appears to value access and 
influence to the chief executive as central to his approach to advice. 
In addition to access and influence, Ridge also values a strong trust relationship in 
the advice process. Ridge believes his appointment is based on his leadership experience 
and personal trust relationship with the president. However, those same reasons provide 
ample fodder for critics who view his appointment with skepticism given his lack of 
subject matter expertise. In President Bush’s announcement of this new appointment, the 
president states that he has appointed “a distinguished American to lead this effort, to 
strengthen American security: a military veteran, an effective governor, a true patriot, a 
trusted friend.”76 Ridge acknowledges critics who question his appointment and his 
qualifications. A New York Times article is quoted as saying that “this is the culmination 
of twenty-two years of friendship. Bush is looking for someone he trusts.”77 While the 
implication alludes to the political motivations imbedded in his appointment, it highlights 
the most significant factor in making this appointment in the eyes of President Bush: a 
strong trust relationship between an advisor and the chief executive. 
A third aspect central to Ridge’s philosophy and approach to the advice process is 
political savvy and acumen. Ridge discusses his own experience advising the president as 
to whether or not a new cabinet-level department is needed to fully execute the homeland 
security mission. As Ridge assumes this new advisory role focused on domestic security 
matters in the uncertainty following the September 11 attacks, he and his team become 
increasingly aware of the limitations faced by both their newly formed office and the 
national domestic security apparatus already in existence. This emerging concept of 
homeland security is as broad as it is diverse, covering everything from border controls to 
coordinating local, state and federal law enforcement efforts. As Ridge describes, there 
was a natural reaction to the events of 9/11 that included increased security processes, 
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staffing and hardening of various critical infrastructure facilities. All of these efforts 
involve huge costs and commitments of resources. In the words of Ridge, 
governors expected OHS (Office of Homeland Security) to pay. They 
were under the impression I had money to distribute. I had none. This was 
just one more illustration of the challenges we had as an office of 
influence rather than a center of authority.78  
To make matters even more challenging, Ridge describes the existing territorial 
relationships between various stakeholders, including federal law enforcement, the 
Department of Defense and the National Security Council as a complicating factor. The 
bureaucracy was not well-structured to address the increased needs of this new homeland 
security enterprise. Ridge and his team would need to spearhead an effort to both secure 
the resources in a resource-constrained environment and push for the structural changes 
necessary to achieve the mission with which they were tasked.  
In the face of this landscape, Ridge and his team were required to advocate for 
both a new budget and a new governmental structure. Ridge and his own advisors were 
convinced a new border-centric security department would be necessary, one with 
authority and accountability of a cabinet-level department. Despite this desire, President 
Bush, his senior staff members, such as Chief of Staff Andrew Card, and other cabinet-
level officials did not believe a separate department was a good idea. They believed 
Ridge’s role was as an advisor whose sole responsibility was to the president, not to 
members of Congress. Ridge describes the requests to appear before Congress: “Indeed, 
the president prohibited my testimony, holding to the tenet that Oval Office advisors are 
not subject to congressional subpoena power under the theory of executive privilege and 
that if I were to go to the Hill, it would set a bad precedent.”79 The former secretary goes 
on to discuss the machinations of members of Congress as they sought to find ways to 
bring the activities of Ridge and his newly formed OHS further under congressional 
oversight. However, despite the president’s reservations and the objections of other 
cabinet members, Ridge becomes increasingly passionate that such a vast array of 
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responsibility—and spending—needed the appropriate department-level authority to 
accompany it. Ridge recognizes his position as an advisor, but also believes his role as a 
cabinet-level official can both continue to provide the advice the president requires while 
also meeting the administrative challenges such a vast responsibility demands. Ridge also 
realizes that changing and expanding his advisory capacity will require a deft, savvy 
navigation of relationships and lobbying to accomplish his objective.  
Ridge acknowledges opposing advice from other cabinet officials and balances it 
against his own realization that a structural change is necessary. His advice is eventually 
embraced as he finds a way to convince the White House of a political inevitability that 
such a cabinet level organization is necessary. He also frames the move as a proactive 
step for the president instead of a reactive one taken in response to congressional efforts. 
Ridge’s lobbying, political acumen and frank guidance directly to the president appear to 
have made the difference. In the absence of stakeholder support and building consensus 
with other colleagues, Ridge believes an audience directly with the president is necessary, 
ensuring he can articulate his message directly to the chief executive. Ridge even 
acknowledges the frustration of other administration officials, including cabinet 
members, when they realized the move is final and will be announced publically without 
an opportunity to lobby against it.80 Ridge achieves a significant milestone that he and 
his advisory team believe is both inevitable and necessary. He achieves this milestone 
through a deft and strategic maneuvering in providing advice. Using his political savvy 
and acumen, his goal is achieved.  
Ridge’s anecdotes offer relevant guidance regarding his philosophy and approach 
to the advice process. These examples are small in number, but serve to demonstrate that 
Ridge’s advice philosophy is centered on notable key features, including maintaining a 
strong information-sharing relationship, access and influence in a relationship to a chief 
executive along with a strong trust relationship and savvy political instincts. 
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B. PEOPLE AND KEY CHARACTERISTICS 
The second dimension from which the advice process can be viewed is through 
examining the characteristics of the advisors upon whom Ridge relied for advice. Despite 
his lack of background in terrorism studies or domestic and international security matters, 
Ridge makes quick work to identify the key support staff advisors he will surround 
himself with as they undertake the creation of a new staff office within the White House. 
His choices in establishing his own advisory team are telling. Ridge begins piecing 
together aides and managers that blend bureaucratic experience, political savvy, personal 
loyalty and interpersonal trust balanced against other key staff positions that may be best 
described as having deep subject matter expertise and bureaucratic experience.  
Ridge’s memoir highlights several of the early staff appointments who possess 
bureaucratic experience, political savvy, and demonstrate personal loyalty along with 
interpersonal trust. They include Mark Holman, a previous chief of staff to Ridge as 
governor, and Ashley Davis, a former Pennsylvania gubernatorial staff member that was 
already serving as deputy director of management administration in the White House.81 
The choice to recruit staff members with whom he had previously worked demonstrates 
the value given to these existing relationships.  
While the personal loyalty and interpersonal trust were important for some staff 
positions, Ridge also blends experienced subject matter experts into his team. Throughout 
this memoir, Ridge credits other key staff members that provide invaluable guidance and 
influence on significant issues. A sample of such acknowledgments includes one to his 
Communications Director Susan K. Neely for her work in establishing what Ridge 
describes as “transparency and information sharing at a level previously unknown in 
Washington.”82 He also credits choices like Steve Abbot, a former accomplished naval 
officer and Rhodes Scholar, as an ideal choice to serve in the deputy role. As Ridge 
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describes, Abbot was “highly organized, had a keen sense of how to identify and 
overcome obstacles, and was unflappable.”83  
Ridge also acknowledges subject matter experts from the National Security 
Council who played a role in shaping significant policy and operational decisions. 
Among them were National Security Council staff member Richard Falkenrath, an 
accomplished academic that Ridge describes as “a rare public official who years before 
had foreseen the global threat of terrorism.”84 Ridge credits Falkenrath with 
understanding the massive budgetary constraints that would be required of this new 
homeland security posture.85 Ridge also acknowledges that some national security 
experts adamantly opposed the new Office of Homeland Security’s strategic direction. 
One such example is Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, the nuclear physics specialist who, as Ridge 
describes, believed strongly that it was not wise to separate issues of homeland security 
from the national security staff.86  
While these names highlight a handful of the advisors and staff support positions 
on which Ridge relied, his descriptions within this memoir provide a glimpse into how he 
views his own advisory support team, particularly given his lack of expertise in 
addressing some of the topics assigned under his control. His advisory team blended 
familiar faces with whom he previously worked alongside with thoughtful and talented 
subject matter experts who could work well under pressure while also making significant 
contributions on sensitive policy and operational matters.  
C. ADVICE PROCESS IN ADDRESSING CRISIS 
The third dimension from which the advice process is examined relates to advice 
in a crisis circumstance. In the days following the attacks of 9/11, Ridge ascends to his 
new post at a time of great fear and uncertainty. His first test of how his new advisory 
role is received by government counterparts and the public occurs on his very first day in 
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office. The nation is facing a series of fatal anthrax events with thousands of bogus 
reports and responses. Ridge is thrust into the center of this crisis and is required to 
advise the president in the midst of this unfolding event. 
Three days prior to officially starting his new responsibility as the Homeland 
Security advisor, Ridge was in a meeting at the White House regarding potential threats 
when the news of the first anthrax victim is made public. In the days that followed, a total 
of five people would die and 17 others would become infected from breathing in anthrax 
spores that were sent to media outlets and congressional offices by way of the mail 
system.87 The event is as mysterious as it is frightening, given that the first anonymous 
letters arrives just seven days after September 11. From this event, Ridge walks through 
the evolutions of thought as White House staff, the media and the public grapple with 
understanding this threat, weeding through a lack of information and coping with an 
overwhelming sense of confusion. As Ridge describes, “what no one understood at that 
moment was that these conflicting messages would become a metaphor for a federal 
government facing an unprecedented situation, and that questions of credibility, turf, and 
the politics of terrorism would soon overtake Washington, adding to the confusion and 
anxiety that gripped the entire nation.”88  
Two valuable insights regarding the advice process are derived from Ridge’s 
retelling of the anthrax crisis. First, Ridge offers a descriptive account of how he, as a 
new advisor within an existing advisory arrangement of senior cabinet officials, is 
immersed into the sense-making process as the president, relevant cabinet officials and 
senior advisors come to grips with the growing sense of panic across the country. Ridge 
is keenly aware of how the chief executive absorbs information and engages other 
advisors during discussion. Ridge describes how information is presented to the president 
in meetings with what he terms as the “usual cast of characters,” including Central 
Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet, Attorney General John Ashcroft and Federal 
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Bureau of Investigation Director Robert Mueller.89 Amid growing pressure, he observes 
the communication style of the president, noting the conversational nature of exchanges 
with other advisors. Ridge describes these exchanges as fluid and natural, yet concise 
without much small talk.90 Ridge also observes the president as being highly engaged, 
asking very specific questions and often wading deep into the details. Ridge 
acknowledges this is a different version of the president than the one portrayed in the 
early days of his presidency. As Ridge describes, “these meetings proved otherwise. He 
asked hard questions, and frequently probed for more details. Criticism was rare, 
encouragement frequent, and engagement constant.”91 Ridge’s comments demonstrate 
that he is observing and absorbing the features of his advisory relationship to the 
president, identifying the circumstances, context and level of detail expected by the chief 
executive. This is clearly a key component of Ridge’s observations about the advice 
process during crisis: advisors must observe how chief executives engage their team and 
understand how they absorb information. 
The second insight offered in his retelling of events demonstrates his frustration 
with the territorialism he sees in dealing with a sensitive issue crossing different advisory 
disciplines. Ridge describes this tension as the “politics and turf that would intrude on the 
homeland security message.”92 The unfolding crisis further exacerbates the lack of 
interagency cooperation and only emboldens the secretive nature of information sharing. 
Beyond the conflicting messages communicated to the public by various government 
entities, Ridge grows frustrated that this culture is adversely impacting his own 
credibility with the president and the public. He describes one example when he and 
other cabinet-level officials are not informed by law enforcement counterparts of the 
weaponized nature of the anthrax sent to Senator Tom Daschle’s office.93 This gap and 
friction illustrates the information sharing challenge he faced in the sense-making process 
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of this crisis, further complicated by the pre-existing turf battles inherent in government. 
From this second example, it appears that Ridge firmly believes that open communication 
among and between advisors during an unfolding crisis event is central to effectiveness.  
Ridge’s memoir provides a thoughtful retelling of his own experiences and 
reflections during his time as both the homeland security advisor and as the secretary for 
a new cabinet-level department. The examples offered here are by no means inclusive of 
all of Ridge’s insights on this subject; however, they provide a snapshot of various 
experiences that seem to shape Ridge’s attitude, understanding and approach to both 
giving and receiving advice. 
By looking at Ridge’s philosophy and approach to advice, the people and key 
characteristics and his perspective of advice in the face of an evolving crisis, a few 
themes emerge. First, Ridge’s philosophy of the advice process appears driven by an 
appreciation for timely situational awareness and a robust information sharing 
relationship with close advisors. With regard to the people and key characteristics, Ridge 
values a blend of advisors that bring experience, interpersonal trust and personal loyalty 
as well as other advisors that balance bureaucratic experience and subject matter 
expertise. As Ridge recounts his experience of the advice process in the midst of a crisis 
circumstance, he observes the president’s interactions with other advisors, observing how 
he absorbs information during the sense-making and decision-making phases of crisis. 
Furthermore, Ridge demands open lines of communication among and between advisors 
during the unfolding crisis event.  
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V. CASE STUDY 2: ROBERT M. GATES, FORMER 
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Robert M. Gates’ chronicle titled Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War provides 
the most detailed accounting of experiences and perspective on the advice process of the 
three case studies used in this thesis. Gates offers a thorough reflection from his time 
serving as the secretary of defense from 2006 until 2011. Despite the numerous detailed 
examples available within this memoir, a small sample is selected for further 
consideration. 
The Gates memoir is examined based on the three dimensions of philosophy and 
approach, people and key characteristics valued in advisors, and experiences in the advice 
process during crisis. First, Gates’ philosophy and approach to advice is examined 
through the nuggets of wisdom and observation he offers reflecting on his experiences in 
overseeing the Department of Defense. Gates’ views are shaped by the size the 
Department of Defense, recognized as “the largest and most complex organization on the 
planet, with some three million civilian and uniformed employees.”94 Second, the 
memoir offers a discussion of the individuals upon whom Gates relied to receive 
necessary guidance and advice in making decisions over the immense bureaucracy. The 
third critical dimension of the advice process within the Gates memoir is observing its 
use in addressing crisis, for which an example is analyzed in further detail. 
A. PHILOSOPHY AND APPROACH 
Gates offers a number of observations regarding what he values most in the 
advice process.95 Three notable observations can be made from Gates’ comments 
regarding his overall philosophy and approach to advice. First, Gates emphasizes the 
value of candor and frankness. This observation is illustrated when Gates reflects on his 
initial meeting with President George W. Bush, as the president offers Gates the role of 
secretary of defense. The president insists on candor in meeting with his senior advisors, 
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and as Gates contemplates their interaction, he believes the president is extremely candid 
with him during this initial meeting.96 Gates recounts this discussion held at President 
Bush’s ranch near Crawford, Texas. He states, “I left confident that if I became secretary, 
he would expect and want me to tell him exactly what I thought, and I knew I would have 
no trouble doing that.”97 This observation is a significant factor in his acceptance of this 
position—that the president and Gates would embrace a shared philosophy of how to 
approach giving and receiving advice based on frank and candid discussion.  
Gates knows well from his experience that with an open and candid relationship 
to the president, the secretary must be mindful of his role in serving “only at the pleasure 
of the President.”98 He is forthright in describing the immense responsibility held by a 
secretary of defense, making life and death decisions both for the military abroad and at 
home. This is particularly true in the wake of 9/11, as the secretary is delegated the 
president’s authority to take down any commercial airliner perceived as a threat to the 
United States.99 All of this responsibility, however, is dependent on the second aspect 
identified in the Gates case study regarding his philosophy and approach to advice: a 
strong trust relationship to the chief executive and his most senior advisors is essential. 
He explains that “to be successful, the secretary must build a strong relationship of 
mutual trust with him and also with the White House chief of staff and other senior 
executive staff members—and, most certainly with the director of the Office of 
Management and Budget.”100 He goes on to describe that the role a secretary of defense 
chooses to play in the broader national security team has a direct impact on a president’s 
ability to succeed. His commentary highlights that frank and candid advice is directly 
linked to a strong relationship of mutual trust that must be shared between a chief 
executive and his senior advisors, as they both bare enormous responsibility and share 
that burden together.  
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The third notable observation regarding Gates’s philosophy and approach relates 
to being strategic and politically savvy with relationships in the advice process. Gates’s 
reflections on interactions within the administration demonstrate sensitivity to making 
choices that balance the numerous competing interests and diverse constituencies inside 
and outside of the Pentagon. As he further asserts, the secretary of defense “is constantly 
fighting on multiple fronts, and much of every day is spent developing strategies to win 
fights large and small—and deciding which fights to avoid or concede. The challenge 
was winning the fights that mattered while sustaining and even strengthening 
relationships, while reducing the number of enemies and maximizing the number of 
allies.”101 In balancing a relationship built on trust with the president, Gates 
acknowledges the political savvy and relationship-building is central to both serving as an 
executive of a bureaucratic organization and a senior advisor to the chief executive. 
B. PEOPLE AND KEY CHARACTERISTICS 
Gates identifies the role that many of his staff played in offering advice during his 
time as secretary of defense, recognizing that his new bureaucratic organization included 
a number of competing interests and staff seeking to lend their perspective. Some of this 
unsolicited advice proves overwhelming. As he describes, “There were a large number of 
people eager to help me – some days too many.”102 In assuming his new role, Gates 
relied heavily on a number of experienced staff to channel lower priority issues and 
people with less pressing business away from him, establishing a sensible structure and 
order for briefings. He acknowledges being at risk of drowning, were it not for the efforts 
of key staff such as Deputy Secretary Gordon England, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Pete Pace, and his Chief of Staff Robert Rangel.103 Gates also reflects on what he 
considers one of the best decisions he would make during his time as secretary: deciding 
what subject matter experts and advisors would be included in his new team. He 
describes the advice of outsiders suggesting that he appoint a transition team to purge 
                                                 
101 Ibid., 83. 
102 Ibid., 21. 
103 Ibid. 
 38 
former Secretary Rumsfeld’s civilian team, expecting that he would undoubtedly make 
numerous changes. Gates goes against this prevailing opinion about the advisory 
structure stating, “I would walk into the Pentagon alone, without bringing a single 
assistant or even a secretary.”104 His decision was based on his observations elsewhere of 
the overwhelmingly negative impacts associated with an entirely new team of leadership 
and advisors arriving in a way that resembles a hostile corporate takeover: “In a time of 
war, I didn’t have time to find new people, and we couldn’t afford the luxury of on-the-
job training for novices.”105 Gates’s view is shaped by a belief that the existing team 
consists of capable professionals that need him to express confidence. Any examples of 
bad chemistry in his team would be addressed at a later point in time, as needed.106 Gates 
bets on continuity and his own ability to work with the experienced civilian leadership 
staff to guide the policy needs of the organization, rather than a reliance that a sweeping 
change and a team of outsiders is necessary. This is also a notable decision given the 
departure of his predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld. It is widely speculated in the media and 
within the administration that a completely new leadership direction is needed. However, 
Gates believes the expertise of existing staff is too valuable and takes on the 
responsibility of implementing the change sought be the administration.  
Gates credits one conversation as having a significant influence on how he 
approaches the job in working with his own advisors. John Hamre, a former deputy 
secretary of defense under President Bill Clinton, advises Gates to pay close attention to 
the decision-making process inside of the Pentagon. Gates paraphrases Hamre’s 
suggestion, saying that the Pentagon is “like the old Roman arena—gladiators come 
before the emperor to battle and you decide who is the winner. Someone needs to make 
sure the process within the arena is fair, transparent and objective.”107 Hamre also 
recommends that Gates have advocates within his team that can be mindful of the tools 
and requirements needed today, as well as those needed for the future. This 
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recommendation is a prescient one, as Gates discovers the culture of the Pentagon to be 
overwhelmingly future oriented and often overlooking the immediate needs of the troops 
in the field. Through Hamre’s recommendation, Gates shapes his vision for how he 
intends to interact with key advisors including aides, staff and combatant commanders. 
In reflecting on his strategy to handle advice from the military leadership, Gates 
draws upon his experience as president at Texas A&M University and as director of the 
CIA, where he dealt with subject matter experts like academic faculty and intelligence 
professionals. He explains that the cornerstones of dealing with advice from military 
professionals in his new role at the Pentagon would be to “approach decisions by seeking 
out their ideas and views, by giving them serious consideration, and by being open and 
transparent.”108 However, the most notable feature of his strategy is to ensure all players 
know the options being considered with regard to an issue, but that he would withhold 
sharing his own views until the decision making process was nearing completion.109 
Gates believes this level of candor is central to a strong working relationship with both 
civilian and military advisors and that being clear about his approach helps work through 
complex challenges and choices. As he describes, “In everything I did as Secretary, I 
sought the advice of others—though I did not always heed it—and depended upon others 
for effective implementation of my own decisions.”110  
Gates asserts the importance of listening to good arguments and being open 
minded to change. He explains that demonstrating partnerships, “within the framework of 
the chain of command,” would help illustrate his expectations for frankness and 
encourage the military commander’s best advice.111 Gates also acknowledges the 
importance of symbolic gestures in an effort to both build trust and demonstrate respect 
for his team. He quotes author and political commentator George Will, describing “the 
stagecraft of statecraft” as an important approach to create tangible benefits within his 
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organization.112 This attention to symbolic gestures is useful in demonstrating not only 
appreciation, but also recognition of roles and respect for the institutional history and 
culture. In his words, these gestures helped to reduce the number of leaks and the amount 
of “end runs to the Hill” as compared to his predecessors, a reference to military 
leadership pursuing their own political agenda separate from the secretary.113 He also 
makes clear that his strategy of candor, institutional respect and openness is balanced by 
“demonstrating that I was willing to fire people when necessary.”114 This point is salient 
and significant, particularly given his willingness to keep the senior advisory staff from 
his predecessor, refusing to make wholesale changes upon arrival.  
In reviewing Gates’s view of advice through the people that advise him and their 
key characteristics, Gates is unique in adopting existing staff and advisory support 
wholesale, believing that a hostile takeover of new people poses too great a risk to both 
the mission and morale.115 He relies on his own ability to manage the staff rather than 
introducing sweeping change. Yet Gates also communicates an important message that he 
can fire them if needed, ensuring they understand they work at his discretion, just as 
Gates understood in receiving his appointment from the president. Gates also highlights 
his strategy for interacting with experienced advisors that are both senior military 
commanders and seasoned subject matter experts. He believes that he must be open-
minded to the new ideas brought forward by advisors, while also respecting the chain of 
command. He further asserts that he wishes to be transparent about the options under 
consideration, withholding his own judgment until a decision is nearing completion. 
Lastly, Gates places value on respecting the institutional culture. He believes that small 
gestures of respect help unify his staff and advisors around a single agenda, averting the 
dissention and end-runs that undermine the administration.  
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C. ADVICE PROCESS IN ADDRESSING CRISIS 
In looking at the advice process in the face of crisis circumstances, the Gates 
memoir provides numerous examples from which to draw upon, thanks in large part to 
Gates’s detailed recollection of major events and decisions encountered during his time 
as secretary. There are no shortages of potential crises circumstances, some that are 
urgent while others slowly evolve, lacking the necessary attention required to address the 
underlying conditions causing the problem. At a strategic level, Gates and his team are 
facing two wars, both of which continue to grow less popular in the eyes of politicians 
and the public. Gates also serves through a wide range of events that could easily meet 
the definition of an evolving crisis circumstance. Examples include a very unpopular 
decision to extend troop deployments to 15 months in order to support the war efforts, a 
scandal that occurred at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, tension and a number of 
potentially catastrophic conflicts in the Middle East that risk escalation to armed conflict, 
a mishandling of a shipment of nuclear weapons that unintentionally could have signaled 
aggression to other world powers and several public relations mishaps involving 
combatant commanders.116 For this analysis, the most revealing example of Gates’ views 
toward the advice process in crisis involves the bureaucracy of the Pentagon and the 
struggle to obtain the necessary equipment for troops in the field. The story is an example 
of a slow moving crisis that demands attention when inaction is costing American troops 
their lives.  
As Gates describes, one of the biggest challenges as both an advisor and senior 
decision-maker in his own bureaucratic institution is implementing change when the 
evidence warrants such a need. Gates describes the challenges in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan by explaining, “after initial successes in both countries, when the situation in 
both began to deteriorate, the president, his senior civilian advisors, and the senior 
military leaders had not recognized that most of the assumptions that underpinned early 
military planning had proven wrong, and no necessary adjustments had been made.”117 
Gates seizes on this observation in driving arguably his proudest accomplishment during 
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his tenure as secretary: cutting through an overly bureaucratic process and ensuring that 
troops in the field receive the necessary equipment to do their jobs as safely as possible.  
Gates tells a compelling story of the Mine Resistant, Ambush-Protected Vehicle, 
(known by the acronym MRAP) and the remarkable ability of this vehicle to protect 
troops in the field. Yet his story is one of navigating bureaucratic obstacles within the 
Pentagon to ensure this tool was procured and delivered to troops in harm’s way. As 
Gates describes, he was first made aware of the equipment’s remarkable ability to protect 
troops when he read a press summary of a Tom Vanden Brook article in USA Today from 
April 19, 2007.118 The article described the unique V-shaped hull of this vehicle that 
dramatically reduces deaths and injuries to troops from improvised explosive devices 
(IED).119 By the end of 2006, IEDs account for nearly 80% of casualties incurred by U.S. 
soldiers.120 Gates discovers the initial request for such vehicles dates back to 2003, yet 
only a small number were procured and deployed in the field, primarily to support 
explosive disposal teams. The Army actively sought replacements for the lightly 
protected Humvee, yet the MRAP was not considered a long-term replacement and 
therefore was not procured in any great quantity. This vehicle’s ability to better protect 
troops was clear. In the words of Gates, “whatever the reason, there were hardly any 
MRAPS in Iraq when I was briefed in April of 2007. But I knew damn well that our 
troops were being burned and blown up in Humvees well before I became secretary and 
that had they been in MRAPs, many soldiers would have escaped injury or death.”121 
Gates’ recounting of the MRAP story is a telling circumstance in the advice 
process during this crisis-type event. The recommendation of former Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Hamre proves salient, as Gates sees firsthand that senior advisors within the 
Pentagon were myopically focused on the future of the organization, paying little 
attention to the current state. The large and overwhelming bureaucracy created an 
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organizational culture sometimes unable to see clues to solving large problems. Gates 
explains, 
the senior civilians who were my top deputies in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, the undersecretaries, had a policy advisory role and 
direct authority only within their own areas of responsibility. The very size 
and structure of the department assured ponderousness, if not paralysis, 
because so any different organizations had to be involved in even the 
smallest decisions.122  
This story illustrates how Gates identifies a significant weakness within his own 
advisory arrangement and that he demands changes, influencing how the Pentagon 
addresses complex issues going forward. In the face of an evolving crisis, Gates 
recognizes a weakness in his own advisory structure, that the culture of the Pentagon 
pushes advisors to be focused on the future and overlooking the needs of today. In the 
face of an evolving crisis, one where the signals are overlooked by others, Gates 
recognizes his role in challenging the conventional thinking to push for change.  
From all three dimensions of the advice process, the Gates memoir offers concise 
reflections on his own experiences. With regard to his philosophy and approach, Gates 
emphasizes the importance of candid and frank discussion with the chief executive. He 
further highlights the importance of establishing a mutual trust relationship, one that 
emphasizes the shared ownership of responsibility between chief executives and advisors. 
He also believes the advice process requires being strategic and politically savvy in 
managing the issues that matter most and the relationships with others. In evaluating the 
people and characteristics, Gates trusts his own ability to manage civilian staff, choosing 
not to bring with him his own advisory team and instead believing in his own ability to 
hold staff accountable and fire them if necessary. For advice in crisis, Gates sees 
organizational culture as a risk. It should be noted that organizational culture differs from 
the institutional culture he previously credits. In this instance, organizational culture leads 
to myopic thinking where clues to an evolving crisis went unnoticed. Gates believes the 
chief executive must hold advisors accountable and push for change when necessary.  
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VI. CASE STUDY 3: HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, FORMER 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
Hillary Rodham Clinton’s book Hard Choices serves as the third case study for 
this thesis.123 This writing represents her second published memoir, having also written a 
2003 memoir called Living History, focused on her time as first lady to the United 
States.124 Hard Choices addresses Clinton’s time as secretary of state, beginning with her 
campaign concession to Senator Obama during the 2008 presidential election and 
covering the events that transpired during her tenure as secretary until her resignation in 
2013. Hard Choices is heavily focused on the policy issues and notable foreign affairs 
relationships that occurred during her time as secretary. However, buried within the 
policy analysis offered by Clinton are the notable comments and observations used to 
extrapolate her view on the advice process. It is a sampling of these comments that 
provides the data for the third and final case study. 
Clinton’s memoir is an ideal fit for the third case study, given its focus on the 
intersection of both homeland security and national security affairs. The Department of 
State represents the diplomatic link between the United States and other nations, 
providing a different yet complimentary angle from which to examine the advice process 
in the sphere of national security. As in the previous two case studies, a brief examination 
of the advice process is offered based on three components: Secretary Clinton’s 
philosophy and approach to the advice process, examples of advisors Secretary Clinton 
highlights in her memoir and why, as well as a brief examination of how the secretary 
describes giving and receiving advice in the midst of evolving crisis. 
A. PHILOSOPHY AND APPROACH  
Throughout this memoir, Clinton offers views from which her perspective on the 
advice process is derived. Clinton’s philosophy on the advice process can best be 
described as a balance of strategy and diplomacy. While her reflections on the overall 
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advice process are not nearly as straightforward or candid in comparison to the Gates 
case study, her perspective is presented as an expression of her strategic approach to 
making decisions and advising the president on significant choices.  
Clinton provides insight on her philosophy and approach to her role as secretary 
of state. As Clinton describes, “I have always believed that, even more than our military 
and economic power, America’s values are the greatest source of strength and security. 
This isn’t just idealism; it’s based on a clear-eyed evaluation of our strategic position.”125 
This statement is influential and underlies many of the anecdotes offered throughout this 
text, both pertaining to examples of the advice process as well as her approach to making 
decisions. The idea of a central strategic approach to decision making, one that believes 
American core values are the guiding principles for any diplomatic engagement, appears 
to be a central component of her view on giving and receiving advice. Her anecdotes 
often tie back to how America’s values guide significant decisions and how she frames 
problems when advising the president or other White House staff.  
Clinton’s view on the advice process is also shaped by her approach to addressing 
challenges in the foreign policy landscape. She indicates that she devotes a significant 
amount of time to reflecting on the experiences of previous secretaries, the landscapes 
they faced and the ways in which they balanced security, continuity and change.126 
Clinton arrives at her preferred method for a decision-making doctrine through this 
reflection. She describes her methodology as one of “smart power,” where she seeks to 
embrace a fluid and dynamic mix of ideas and approaches to solve increasing complex 
problems.127 She goes on to describe smart power as “choosing the right combination of 
tools—diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal and cultural—for each 
situation.”128 Clinton describes the efforts of the past, the reliance on a formal relational 
architecture of institutions and alliances in order to manage international affairs, as sturdy 
yet dated and too inflexible to absorb and respond to the challenges facing the world 
                                                 
125 Clinton, Hard Choices, 77. 
126 Ibid., 29. 
127 Ibid., 31. 
128 Ibid. 
 47 
today and in the future. Through this lens, Clinton embraces an open and creative style of 
integrating associations to produce meaningful outcomes. From an advice standpoint, 
such statements support a view that traditional thinking will be inadequate to meet the 
changing needs of the modern world.  
B. PEOPLE AND KEY CHARACTERISTICS  
Secretary Clinton’s team of advisors reflects a diverse mix of individuals that 
share her strategic vision and use of the smart power methodology to address problems 
and offer advice. Clinton acknowledges that as secretary of state, a significant part of her 
responsibilities involves supporting the career service employees who make up the 
majority of the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development. As she 
describes, “secretaries come and go every few years, but most of the people … stay far 
longer.”129 She goes on to note that increases in demands on the employees, in the face of 
dwindling budgets, had left career professionals “eager for leadership that championed 
the work they did.”130 Clinton sought a dedicated team that demanded results and shared 
her values, particularly in supporting the broad work conducted across the entire State 
Department.  
Clinton’s team of advisors at the State Department included her counselor and 
Chief of Staff Cheryl Mills, someone who “talked fast and thought even faster; her 
intellect was like a sharp blade, slicing and dicing every problem she encountered.”131 
She goes on to describe Mills as having “a huge heart, boundless loyalty, rock-solid 
integrity and a deep commitment to social justice.”132 In addition to being a trusted 
confidant, Clinton describes her primary role as managing the building and addressing 
the day to day bureaucracy of running the Department. She is also assigned as a principal 
liaison to the White House on various food, health and social justice issues. 
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Clinton also discusses a controversy surrounding her preferred candidate as Chief 
of Protocol, the position that oversees foreign delegation visits and travels abroad with 
the president.133 Clinton’s experiences as first lady supported her personal view that 
Capricia Marshall, a former White House social secretary, would have the best 
understanding of the diplomacy associated with this sensitive role. However, Clinton and 
one of President Obama’s top advisors were at odds, disagreeing over her selection. In 
the end, Clinton is able to adequately lobby the White House to look past what she 
viewed as a journey “from campaign rivals to respectful colleagues.”134 She describes the 
disagreement as one of rival political camps, each vying for their own appointee to take 
this role. In the end, President Obama’s staff allows Secretary Clinton to make the 
appointment of Marshall, and she grew to be a trusted and respected part of the 
administration as her advice was central to the success of the administration’s foreign 
engagements. As Clinton describes, “near the end of my tenure as Secretary, the 
President sent a farewell note to Cheryl, saying that we had grown from a ‘team of rivals’ 
into ‘an unrivaled team.’ “135 For Clinton, her selection of what she perceived as a key 
advisory appointment was indicative of how the political lines from the previously 
contentious campaign could be overcome through the selection of talented and capable 
professionals in key advisory capacities. 
Clinton’s memoir credits a number of other aides as essential players in her 
advice process. She identifies Jake Sullivan as a trusted advisor from her political 
campaign that would go on to serve as her deputy chief of staff for policy and later the 
director of policy planning. She describes Sullivan as someone with impeccable 
credentials, having served as a Rhodes Scholar, Supreme Court clerk and a Senate 
aide.136 Sullivan appears as a central figure throughout many of the stories in Clinton’s 
memoir, indicating his principal role in helping address a number of high profile events 
and challenges throughout Clinton’s tenure. 
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Clinton also speaks highly of Lissa Muscatine, a former White House 
speechwriter that would reprise this role for Clinton at the State Department. Clinton’s 
reflections on Muscatine speak to the criticality of the rhetoric in the diplomacy process, 
as many of the anecdotes Clinton shares throughout the memoir focus on how Clinton 
sought to strike the proper tone in a speech or to send a firm message in a public 
appearance. 
Clinton also praises her longtime aide and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations 
Huma Abedin along with Director of Scheduling Lona Valmoro for the key roles they 
play in selecting and coordinating visits and stops by the secretary across the world.137 
This responsibility goes well beyond a simple balancing of invitations and trip logistics; 
visits by a sitting Secretary of State represent key diplomatic engagements and 
messaging; therefore, each stop must be carefully selected and managed. As Clinton 
would describe, executing her vision meant that she would “get out beyond the Foreign 
Ministries and palaces and meet with citizens, especially community activists and 
volunteers; journalists; students and professors; business, labor, and religious leaders, the 
civil society that helps hold governments accountable and drives social change.”138 
While Clinton emphasizes the importance of capable, trusted and loyal staff to 
hold staff support advisory positions, Clinton sought a different approach to high-profile 
envoys designated to address significant diplomatic challenges. Instead of relying on 
loyalists for these posts, Clinton sought out highly regarded professionals some may have 
viewed as rivals for her own position. As many observers critiqued, the use of envoys as 
advisors for targeted missions, particularly diplomats with significant foreign policy 
experience, could have overshadowed her role and influence as secretary of state.139 
However, Clinton’s perspective is that “appointing people who were qualified to serve as 
Secretary themselves enhanced my reach and the administration’s credibility.”140 For 
these special responsibilities, Clinton taps Richard Holbrooke to be the special 
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representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and former Senator George Mitchell to 
represent her interests in the Middle East. Clinton describes these two envoys were 
extreme opposites in terms of personality and approach. Clinton goes on to state that 
“George was Holbrooke’s opposite, as buttoned up as Richard was wide open, but he had 
a wealth of experience and expertise.”141 With regard to Holbrooke, Clinton describes 
him as “a force of nature who was widely viewed as the premier diplomat of our 
generation.”142 He previously served as United Nations Ambassador and was 
instrumental in brokering peace in the Balkans during the 1990s.143  
Clinton also describes Holbrooke’s relentless and aggressive style as difficult to 
get used to, often at odds with young White House aides. She states, “Holbrooke’s old-
school style of diplomacy—that mix of improvisation, flattery, and bluster that had 
outmaneuvered Milosevic – was a bad fit in a White House that was intent on running an 
orderly policy process with as little drama as possible.”144 Regardless of his sometimes 
difficult approach, Clinton believes that Holbrooke was a significant asset in the advice 
process, particularly in addressing sensitive decisions about resource deployments and 
troop surges. Despite his untimely death in December of 2010, his influence was 
indelible and his successors, first Frank Ruggiero and then retired Ambassador Marc 
Grossman, carried on the mission. Demonstrating yet another unique personality, Clinton 
describes Ruggiero as “a dramatic departure from his predecessor, but he brought 
uncommon skill and subtlety to the job.”145 While the use of special envoys by presidents 
and secretaries of state is not a new or novel practice, its use in this instance represented a 
potential weakening of influence for Secretary Clinton. Yet, in adopting a team-of-rivals-
style approach, Clinton valued empowering would-be competitors over the risks of 
diminishing her own influence. 
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C. ADVICE PROCESS IN ADDRESSING CRISIS 
Hard Choices is filled with stories portraying the diplomatic engagements that 
shape U.S. foreign policy from 2009 until 2013. For the purpose of examining the advice 
process in crisis, two examples are studied. Both illustrate advice that is both received 
and given under the parameters and constraints of a crisis circumstance.  
While it is true that a majority of crisis events at the executive level of U.S. 
government rarely require urgent action, there are instances where the constraints of time 
shape the outcome and the collective decision-making capacity of the secretary. To 
overcome the risks associated with making significant decisions in limited time, she 
relies upon the input of her team as they worked to make sense of circumstances and 
make a decision. One example of a diplomatic crisis involves a Chinese dissident seeking 
American assistance on the eve of a Strategic and Economic Summit being held in 
Beijing.146 In April of 2012, a blind human rights activist in China named Chen 
Guangcheng escaped his house arrest in Shandong province and was being sought by the 
Chinese security service. Chen, as he was known, was widely recognized in China as the 
“barefoot lawyer,” a poor villager turned activist advocating against human rights abuses 
experienced by other rural poor.147 Chen was sentenced to prison and then kept beyond 
his incarceration under house arrest, cut off from the outside world, in what was widely 
viewed as a miscarriage of justice.148 After making his escape and traveling a great 
distance to Beijing, Chen reached out to an American foreign service officer at the 
American Embassy to request assistance. 
The timing of the event placed Secretary Clinton and Treasury Secretary Tim 
Geithner in a difficult position, as they were merely days away from attending a summit 
in Beijing that was a year in the making. As Clinton describes,  
It appeared that I had to decide between protecting one man, albeit a 
highly sympathetic and symbolic figure, and protecting our relationship 
with China. On one side of the scale were America’s core values and our 
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status as a beacon of freedom and opportunity; on the other were many of 
our most urgent security and economic priorities.149  
As the event unfolded, Clinton’s team at the Beijing Embassy advised her that 
Chen’s safety was in danger. Chen’s mobility was limited because of his blindness, and 
therefore, a decision on whether or not to extend refuge in the U.S. Embassy was needed 
within the hour.150 Secretary Clinton communicated with her key advisory staff, 
including Sullivan, Mills, Deputy Secretary Bill Burns and subject matter experts like 
Kurt Campbell, to consider the options and risks associated with offering temporary 
asylum to Chen.151 The decision was one with implications far beyond one man, as it 
severely inhibited a sensitive relationship between the U.S. and China. In pulling together 
her team, Clinton explains that “in the end, it wasn’t a close call,” and the decision to 
rendezvous and assist Chen is a necessity.152 Clinton explains that the credibility of the 
United States, after decades of talk regarding human rights in China, is now on the line 
and that “if we didn’t help Chen, it would undermine our position everywhere.”153 
Clinton’s embrace of advice through a strategic approach, one that is deeply rooted in a 
commitment to American values, helps her and her advisors arrive at a decision that is 
clear to her team, despite the potential consequences and blowback.  
While Clinton’s team arrived at a consensus decision based on a strategic view of 
American diplomatic values, Clinton explains that White House aides were more 
skeptical. They were concerned about the risk of damage to America’s relationship with 
China, particularly at a time of heightened tension between the two countries, as each 
nation worked to address disputes over such significant issues as access to the South 
China Sea and economic policy.154 However, Clinton makes clear that no one in the 
White House wanted to be responsible for leaving Chen to his fate and, therefore, 
supported Secretary Clinton’s decision. Clinton’s advisory team shared her vision and 
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commitment to a value-driven approach in decision making. While this circumstance 
occurred under the unique pressure of a compressed timeline associated with a significant 
evolving crisis, her advisory structure worked as a team to arrive at a recommendation. In 
the days ahead, Clinton’s advisory team performed a delicate diplomatic exercise with 
the Chinese, using patience, diplomacy and open communication to obtain a mutually 
agreed upon outcome. Chen received necessary medical attention; he and his family were 
then granted visas to the United States, where Chen goes on to study law at New York 
University. 
Clinton’s advisory team worked tirelessly to support her vision, helping lay the 
foundation for Clinton to negotiate directly with her Chinese counterpart. Despite the 
rhetoric and criticism swirling in the media inside of both countries, Clinton’s advisors 
created an environment where negotiations could thrive and both parties could ensure that 
the economic summit would continue, not falling victim to this unexpected crisis-event.  
Beyond an examination of how Secretary Clinton interacted with her own 
advisors, Clinton’s memoir also provides insight into how she perceives her role as an 
advisor to President Obama. Numerous examples exist throughout this writing, but the 
decision-making process leading to a raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in 
Abbottabad, Pakistan, on May 1, 2011 provides a window from which her advisory 
capacity may best be examined.155 
Clinton describes the evolution of this decision from her vantage point as 
America’s chief diplomat. To fully comprehend the complexity of this decision, one must 
first understand the events leading up to this decision within the Obama administration. 
Throughout the summer and fall of 2009, President Obama’s cabinet and other senior 
advisors engaged in a months-long assessment of the U.S. military’s strength in 
Afghanistan.156 This process was one of the first major military decisions needed by the 
new Obama administration and requires the president’s team to wrestle with the idea of 
adding troops to a war in which Barack Obama had campaigned to end during the 
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election cycle. Throughout this difficult process, the new administration eventually 
arrived at a decision to add troops, known as the surge. This surge meant an extended 
commitment in Afghanistan and a need for a stronger reliance on Pakistan to both support 
and supply the troops, as well as to take military action in the Pakistani tribal areas where 
Taliban and al Qaeda fighters were thought to be hiding. 
It is under these circumstances and amid this troop surge that CIA Director Leon 
Panetta asked to meet privately over lunch with Secretary Clinton in March of 2011. As 
Clinton recalls, Panetta stated “we’ve got a lead.”157 Clinton describes Panetta’s words as 
“tracking the best lead they’d had in years about the possible whereabouts of Osama bin 
Laden.”158 The CIA had slowly and privately begun looping in high-ranking 
administration officials, starting with the White House and relevant cabinet members as 
they continued to collect intelligence. However, the caveat to this information is the 
requirement for the highest order of secrecy—no one beyond the Secretary could know, 
not even her highest ranking staff. As Clinton recalls, it was incredibly difficult to 
interact with her trusted internal team at the State Department, who she could not tell or 
even hint at what was happening. Clinton states, “It has been more than twenty years 
since I’ve been able to do much of anything without at least a dozen people noticing, but 
with a little misdirection, I pulled it off.”159 Clinton explains that a small group of the 
most senior White House aides, CIA and Pentagon officials, including Secretary Gates 
and his special operations commanders, began meeting multiple times at the White 
House, further examining the intelligence surrounding this “high-value target” identified 
in this mysterious compound.160  
The group listened and debated information provided by intelligence experts. 
Some of those experts had a high level of confidence this high value target was bin Laden 
while others were less certain.161 Clinton believes the hesitation is stronger from those 
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who experienced the intelligence failures associated with the belief that former Iraqi 
leader Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. This previous event 
serves as a cautionary tale when evaluating facts versus probability in the intelligence 
process. In assessing the advice process, Clinton describes how the group debates the 
options, with the president immediately taking a joint raid with the Pakistanis off the 
table. The option was eliminated at Clinton’s urging, as she did not believe they could be 
trusted. The team agreed that bombing the compound would raise risks for collateral 
damage and could inhibit the ability to confirm whether he had been there. The only 
viable option appeared to be a raid by Special Operations forces, if the President agreed 
the intelligence was accurate and reliable. Clinton shares how Secretary of Defense Gates 
and Vice President Joe Biden were skeptical, understanding that the potential fallout from 
the Pakistanis could jeopardize military operations elsewhere. They also pointed to the 
failure of Operation Eagle Claw in 1980, when eight military members died in the Iranian 
desert as a result of a collision in route to rescue U.S. hostages.162 
This decision illustrates how a president’s cabinet and highest ranking advisors 
examine a significant decision with extremely high-risk consequences. However, as 
Clinton explains, “I respected Bob and Joe’s concerns about the risks of a raid, but I came 
to the conclusion that the intelligence was convincing and the risks were outweighed by 
the benefits of success.”163  
The president convened the group one final time on April 28, 2011 to obtain final 
recommendations from his senior-most team of advisors. Each participant was asked to 
state their position. Clinton, speaking from her perspective as both the chief diplomat for 
the United States and as a senior voice in the advisory process, describes the what she 
conveyed during the meeting: 
So I methodically laid out the case, including the potential damage to our 
relationship with Pakistan and the risks of a blown operation. But, I 
concluded, the chance to get bin Laden was worth it. As I had experienced 
firsthand, our relationship with Pakistan was strictly transactional, based 
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on mutual interest, not trust. It would survive. I thought we should go for 
it.164 
Clinton goes on to state that divisions of opinions on the raid still existed at the 
end of this meeting, but the president knew it was his decision to make. In the end, 
Operation Neptune Spear, as the raid would be known, went forward. Osama bin Laden 
was killed during this operation, bringing to a close one of the most significant manhunts 
in American history.  
This example represents an important moment when a senior cabinet official truly 
plays the role of an advisor in a high stakes and highly sensitive crisis circumstance. Due 
to the clandestine nature of this decision, Clinton did not have the luxury of her own 
advisory apparatus that would typically be available to address or reflect upon tough 
decisions. Clinton describes that “these were difficult and emotional issues. Unlike most 
matters I handled as Secretary of State, because of the extreme secrecy of this case there 
was no trusted advisor I could turn to or expert I could call.”165 But in reflecting back on 
her role as an advisor on one of the most sensitive and high-risk decisions of the Obama 
presidency, Clinton credits her observation of the president’s evaluative style and her 
understanding of how best he receives information. As she explains, “the President and I 
are both lawyers, and I had learned over time how to appeal to his highly analytical 
mind.”166 By no means does Clinton take credit for swaying the president’s final 
decision, but her ability to lay out her argument in a way in which the president would 
best absorb her position creates the conditions for her advice to be well received. It likely 
contributed to the successful outcome. 
The Clinton case study illustrates the advice process through the lens of 
diplomatic relationships and the different set of stresses and risks associated with it. With 
regard to Clinton’s philosophy and approach, the advice process has a direct correlation 
to diplomacy and requires a smart power approach that is versatile, using a variety of 
different tools for a variety of different situations. Clinton’s philosophy also recognizes 
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that institutions lack flexibility to solve challenges in an evolving world. Advice must 
balance respect for institutions while also encouraging new thinking whenever possible. 
For people and the key characteristics of advisors, Clinton relies on loyalists with whom 
she holds a strong trust relationship, yet she also recognizes that sensitive high profile 
advisory positions demand established, accomplished equals to extend her own 
diplomatic reach. In evaluating her experiences with advice in crisis, Clinton emphasizes 
that advice and tough decisions must be rooted in a strategic vision and understanding of 
core values. Clinton also emphasizes the importance of making strong arguments that 
appeal to the specific style and preferences of the chief executive. 
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VII. CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
The previous three case studies explore each memoir on three dimensions: 1) an 
overall view of their philosophy and approach to the advice process; 2) the people and 
key characteristics they valued in the advisors with whom they surrounded themselves; 
and 3) an evaluation of how they participated or experienced the advice process during an 
evolving crisis circumstance. Through an analysis of the material and sample anecdotes 
selected for discussion within each case study, some commonalities and differences 
emerge regarding their opinions and experiences. By examining each case study in 
comparison to one another on these three identified dimensions, a useful framework of 
recommendations emerges, as depicted in Table 1. 
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Table 1.   Case Study Comparison 
 
 
A. PHILOSOPHY AND APPROACH TO THE ADVICE PROCESS 
For the first case study, Secretary Tom Ridge’s reflections highlight an advice 
philosophy deeply rooted in his professional experiences as an elected official, having 
previously served as a member of Congress and as a chief executive in state government. 
His observations on the advice process are less pronounced than the other case studies as 
he devotes much of his memoir to recounting the behind-the-scenes events that transpired 
and shaped his personal experiences. Yet within this recollection are a number of 
observations from which the dimensions of the advice process are viewed. 
Philosophy and Approach to the Advice Process People and Key Characteristics Advice Process in Crisis
Appreciates the importance of timely situational 
awareness and robust information sharing.
Relies on a mix of trusted advisors and 
subject matter experts.
Observes the way a chief executive 
absorbs information and interacts with 
other advisors in the sense-making and 
decision-making phases of crisis.
Values a strong trust relationship, access and 
influence in a relationship to a chief executive.
Ensures trusted confidants are in key 
positions but also balanced with senior, 
experienced subject matter experts.
Demands open lines of communications 
between advisors during unfolding crisis 
events.
Relies on savvy political instincts to address 
difficult challenges and navigate bureaucracy.
Emphasizes the criticality of candid discussion with 
frank and forward advice.
Values continuity and relies on his own 
ability to work with the experienced civilian 
leadership staff, rather than sweeping 
changes and a team of outsiders 
Sees organizational culture as a risk that 
inhibits advisors from recognizing the 
signs of crisis.
Emphasizes the importance of establishing a 
mutual trust relationship with the chief executive 
and other advisors.
Entertains new ideas by being open-minded 
within the framework of the chain of 
command, transparent about choices, and 
withholds his own views until the decision-
making process nears completion. 
Warry of organizational paralysis in an 
advice process mired in bureaucracy and 
advocates that chief executives must 
push for change to challenge 
conventional thinking.
Believes one must be strategic about priorities and 
politically savvy in managing relationships.
Pays close attention to the small gestures 
that demonstrate respect for institutional 
culture and can motivate staff.
Applies a variety of tools to a variety of 
circumstances.
Relies on key loyalists with whom she 
already holds a strong trust relationship
Emphasizes that advice must be rooted in 
a clear strategic vision and understanding 
of values.
Recognizes that institutions lack the flexibility to 
solve challenges in an evolving world.
Balances loyalists on staff with 
accomplished equals in key advisory roles in 
a team-of-rivals styled approach.
Adapts a strong argument and appeal to 
the style of the chief executive.
Balances respect for institutions but encourages 
new ways of thinking whenever possible.
Case Study #1: 
Tom Ridge
Case Study #2: 
Robert Gates
Case Study #3: 
Hillary Clinton
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From an evaluation of the anecdotes highlighted in this case study, Ridge’s own 
experience in the unfolding events of 9/11 emphasize his appreciation for advisors that 
provide timely information and emphasize a strong, open communication and 
information sharing relationship, recognizing his own thirst for answers in the face of 
uncertainty and limited access to staff. Ridge’s advice philosophy also values a strong 
trust relationship between the advisor and a chief executive, highlighting this feature as a 
cardinal reason for his own selection to advise President Bush. Ridge further emphasizes 
access to the chief executive as a central motivation when he accepts the role, 
acknowledging that a direct audience to the chief executive is required for him to achieve 
success as an advisor.  
A third key strength illustrated in the Ridge examples regarding his philosophy on 
advice relates to political savvy and instincts. It is his political acumen and ability to 
work within the bureaucratic institutions of the federal government that make a difference 
as he works to influence the president’s actions. This is illustrated in his efforts to 
establish DHS as a cabinet-level department against the wishes of other advisors. Ridge 
works within the established advisory structure as often as possible, but also makes 
difficult and potentially unpopular choices to go outside of that system to accomplish a 
stated goal, as is the case in his example of directly lobbying President Bush. While 
occasionally frustrated with the bureaucracy, he also excels at working within it, placing 
high value on his ability to navigate the system to achieve meaningful outcomes. His 
narrative explores the labyrinth of interpersonal relationships he is required to navigate in 
order to establish credibility for his new responsibilities in the emerging homeland 
security discipline. He invests significant energy into examining the political nuances of 
working in the executive branch of government, first as an advisor responsible only to the 
president and then as a cabinet level official balancing the interests and demands of 
congressional inquiries and budgetary challenges. Navigating the political climate heavily 
influences his efforts, in part due to his unfamiliarity and uncertainty associated with 
serving in a completely new position. He relies heavily on his political instincts, 
something with which he has honed throughout his career. When selecting an approach to 
providing advice, it appears that Ridge weighs the political implications of his actions 
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against the value and need of the intended outcome all due to his strong political acumen 
that defines his effectiveness in advising President Bush.  
In evaluating Case Study 2, Gates provides significant depth in his description of 
the advice process. Gates believes firmly in the concept that an advisor serves at the 
pleasure of the executive; nevertheless, he recognizes this relationship demands the 
exchange of frank, straightforward advice. His recommendation for balancing the 
nuances in this advisor/advisee relationship is built on a climate of open, candid 
discussion. He emphasizes the criticality of mutual trust with the executive and also 
highlights the importance of establishing this culture early on in the relationship. Gates 
further asserts that the environment of mutual trust must extend beyond the chief 
executive and exist with other senior advisors, citing that success as a role player on the 
larger advisory team will directly impact the ability for the president to succeed. Gates 
focuses on the importance of sustaining and even strengthening relationships through 
political savvy.  
Gates also highlights the guidance of former Deputy Secretary of Defense John 
Hamre as shaping his overall philosophy. Hamre recommended Gates pay close attention 
to the decision-making process within his organization, ensuring the advocacy and 
decision-making process is as fair and objective as possible.167 Gates heeded Hamre’s 
warning that advocates not become so future oriented that they fail to meet the needs of 
the present, which turns out to be one of the biggest weaknesses he observes within the 
Department of Defense. Such a critique is also rooted in the existing advice process of the 
organization as advisors are contributing to this lack of vision, failing to meet the needs 
of current troops in the field. 
Another key feature of Gates’s philosophy draws upon a leadership lesson that 
has a direct link to empowering advisors. Gates notes the importance of symbolic 
gestures in dealing with key staff. He recognizes that tangible benefits exist to 
demonstrating appreciation or acknowledging the roles of advisors, particularly as it 
relates to institutional culture. This is a key observation, as Gates believes something as 
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simple a symbolic gesture helps to reduce what he describes as end-runs or leaks. He 
believes these gestures dampen the interests of potential dissenters when they attempt to 
spearhead a separate political agenda. 
For Case Study 3, Secretary Clinton’s perspective on the advice process is more 
nuanced and less explicit in directly describing her views on the advice process. 
However, Clinton explains the view of her overall strategy in how she approaches her 
responsibilities as secretary of state. Her commentary applies to how she views solving 
problems and receiving advice. For the purposes of this analysis, Clinton’s view of the 
advice process is derived from an understanding of the American strategic position in 
foreign affairs. Clinton identifies strongly with the concept of smart power whereby a 
variety of tools are applied based on the situation. Clinton also gives much credit to an 
open and integrated approach to solving problems, recognizing that institutions of the 
past may lack the flexibility needed to address challenges in an evolving modern world. 
Her policy approach is described in significant detail. It can be argued that this approach 
applies beyond the formation of policy positions and extends to her overall philosophy 
for the inner-workings of a bureaucracy. That bureaucracy includes the advisory 
arrangements responsible for giving and receiving advice while also balancing respect for 
established institutions and encouraging new ways of creative thinking to solve complex 
problems.  
B. PEOPLE AND KEY CHARACTERISTICS VALUED IN ADVISORS 
For the second dimension of the advice process, this thesis looks at each of the 
case studies and the notable people who provide advice within the case studies. While not 
all inclusive, the individuals illustrate examples of the advisors and staff support 
responsible for providing advice. The purpose is to gain a better understanding of the 
team that surrounds each cabinet secretary and what qualities are recognized and valued 
as contributors to effectiveness.  
In the case of Ridge, value is placed on selecting an advisory team that balances 
familiarity along with subject matter expertise. He makes a point to seek out staff with 
whom he has previously worked, but who also hold significant bureaucratic experience. 
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He balances these appointments of loyalty and familiarity by surrounding himself with 
other national security experts. Ridge’s approach to this staffing arrangement ensures that 
he can rely on trusted, loyal colleagues with whom he has previously worked while also 
ensuring that subject matter experts play a prominent role, given his lack of familiarity in 
the disciplines of national and homeland security. 
In the case of Gates, the approach to staffing emphasizes the circumstances under 
which he is appointed (in the midst of two wars). He chooses to accept nearly all of the 
existing staff that served the previous secretary of defense, and credits this choice as a 
key decision in his success, despite the political momentum desperately seeking staffing 
changes in the Defense Department. Gates feels strongly this decision ensured continuity 
within the organization without inflicting harm to the Department’s overall morale. To 
balance this approach, Gates believes that staff must understand that they serve at his 
discretion and that he has control to replace them if necessary. 
In the case of Secretary Clinton, emphasis for staffing is placed on key advisors, 
including a number of loyalists with whom she previously worked with in the White 
House and her own political campaign. However, Clinton adopts a different approach 
when it comes to senior diplomats for the most sensitive targeted missions, choosing to 
recruit special envoys with credentials that rivaled her own. Clinton explains that many 
observers questioned this decision, seeing them as potential competition to her as 
Secretary. However, Clinton embraces this team-of-rivals approach, believing that 
empowering would-be competitors strengthens the advice process and her ability to 
address complex challenges. 
C. ADVICE PROCESS IN ADDRESSING CRISIS 
Ridge recalls the confusion and misinformation that dominated the anthrax crisis 
of 2001. Ridge, a new advisor inside an existing advisory and decision-making apparatus, 
is left to struggle managing information flow and issues of credibility that results from 
territorialism and lacking cooperation. He uses the sense-making task of an evolving 
crisis to both hone his own vision for what must change within the advisory culture and 
to also develop a longer-term strategic vision for the role of his new position in a 
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president’s cabinet. Ridge offers brief reflection on the personal qualities demonstrated 
by the president during briefings with advisors, and it is clear these engagements were 
useful in understanding how to both communicate with the president and advocate for 
decisions he felt were critical. Ridge’s memoir ultimately highlights the need for open 
lines of communication and the risks associated with a failure to communicate during 
crisis decision making. 
The Gates case study offers insight into advice during crisis through the retelling 
of how the Department of Defense eventually addresses the high casualty rate associated 
with improvised explosive devices in Iraq. Gates highlights that the organization’s culture 
was myopically focused on future operations, so much so that advocates were failing to 
bring the needs of the current operations to the forefront. Gates recognizes that the 
massive bureaucracy of the Pentagon creates a near-paralysis when it comes to decisions 
that crossed over different areas of responsibility. Subject matter experts surrounding him 
as the secretary were far too focused on their individual sphere of responsibility and 
missed the signals indicating they were in the midst of an evolving crisis. Gates, heeding 
the previous advice of John Hamre, recognizes the need to push hard for a change of 
direction with regard to the equipment being purchased. Gates credits this action with a 
significant decrease in casualties. From an advice perspective, this example illustrates a 
risk within large organizations: the existing culture, compounded by the massive weight 
of a large bureaucracy, can be a contributing factor to organizational paralysis, inhibiting 
advisors’ abilities to recognize the signs of crisis. Gates understood that his role as the 
leader was to challenge advisors to look beyond conventional thinking when necessary. 
The Clinton case study provides two strong examples of advice during crisis for 
the purpose of this thesis. In addressing an evolving diplomatic crisis between the United 
States and China, Clinton relies heavily on her staff to make quick assessments and 
recommend action that could have far-reaching consequences. But her anecdotes 
illustrate a belief that America’s strategic position is the central-most important factor in 
the advice process and that advice be linked back to a strategic position. 
The Clinton case study offers an even more dramatic example from which the 
advice process is viewed by looking closely at the decision-making process to undertake 
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the Osama bin Laden raid. For this analysis, Clinton’s own words are used to unpack her 
role in advising the president. The key takeaways from the Clinton text highlight how her 
advice, rooted in America’s strategic objectives, advocates against the involvement of the 
Pakistanis as a potential partner to conduct a joint raid. Clinton argues that the American-
Pakistani relationship was strictly transactional and that exposing the whereabouts of bin 
Laden to the Pakistanis would risk the entire operation. She believes the long-term 
relationship between the two countries would have been sustained despite their exclusion, 
a belief rooted in her strategic approach to offering advice. Clinton also takes a strong 
role in laying out the case for why accepting such risks by undertaking this covert 
mission would be worthwhile.  
Clinton’s retelling of this seminal event in American history is instructive for this 
thesis project. Clinton dives deeply into her position and thought process, highlighting the 
efforts she undertook to navigate these difficult and emotionally charged issues while 
also shaping her argument by recognizing the president’s evaluative style. In switching 
gears from a cabinet secretary to a presidential advisor, Clinton lays out an argument 
based on what she has learned about the president’s preferred style of receiving 
information. As previously mentioned and described in her memoir, “I had learned over 
time how to appeal to his highly analytical mind.” The most meaningful takeaway from 
this particular anecdote is Clinton’s emphasis on adapting to the preference and 
information consumption style of the president, ensuring that her advocacy is understood 
and absorbed in the most appropriate way. 
D. CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
These findings offer a small sample of lessons learned from the case study 
analysis previously presented. It is important to note some potential flaws and criticism 
associated with these findings. First, as was noted earlier in the research methodology, 
there are some inherent challenges associated with using memoirs as case studies. The 
commentary provided in each case study represents the subject’s views and is not 
necessarily an objective vantage point from which to make an assessment. However, as 
the research question seeks to examine what factors influence effectiveness, this thesis 
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argues that the words of the subjects in each case study represent an adequate judge of 
effectiveness from a first person viewpoint. 
A second potential criticism is regarding the anecdotes selected for analysis. Each 
case study offered a wide variety of stories for examination; however, a small number 
were identified based on relevance to the three dimensions used in the analysis and due to 
the availability of reflection from each case study subject. For example, while Robert 
Gate’s memoir covers his time as Secretary of Defense for both President Bush and 
President Obama, the analysis uses case studies drawn from his time working for 
President Bush. This is primarily due to the nature of his commentary in the text and its 
usefulness for analysis, given the first portion of the book offers more insight into his 
decision-making philosophy and process. 
Despite these potential criticisms, the findings of this thesis attempt to provide 
insight into the factors associated with effectiveness in both giving and receiving advice. 
These findings are used to illustrate common points identified through analysis of the 
case studies and to synthesize these points as conclusions and recommendations, which 
are addressed in the next two chapters.  
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS  
This thesis unfolded as opportunity to examine the role of advisors in effectively 
supporting executive decision makers within the homeland and national security 
domains. The exploration began with a simple question: What are the factors that 
influence the effectiveness of advisors in homeland security and national security? 
Motivated by an appreciation for an increasingly complex society, homeland and national 
security leaders are the central focus of this writing, particularly given the significance of 
their decisions and the ubiquity of crisis in this area of responsibility.  
While the discussion of advice is as old as the written word, this thesis opens the 
door to a new dialog for academics and practitioners about the features of advice, the 
process of giving and receiving advice, and the role of advisors in addressing 21st 
century crisis. So what has changed during the past two decades? What makes advice in 
today’s environment different from other times in history? The findings of this thesis 
attempt to put these observations into focus.  
A. THE ADVICE PROCESS FROM AN ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVE 
First, this thesis examines the advice process from an academic perspective. The 
conclusions of this review are addressed in the following sections. 
1. Leaders Need Advisors 
This thesis explores literature spanning several academic disciplines in an attempt 
to understand why advice and advisors matter, particularly in the homeland and national 
security disciplines. The author concludes that the role of advisors is growing more 
important in an increasingly complex 21st century world. Advances in technology and 
globalization demonstrate an increasingly interdependent society. Yet as Rebecca Costa 
argues, a failure to manage such complexity, or a belief that individuals can do so alone, 
will undoubtedly lead to failures as society neglects to effectively address evolving 
challenges.168 Individuals addressing problems alone risk reaching their cognitive 
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threshold, described by Costa as a point at when individual fails to think through complex 
problems.169  
The literature review also articulates that an individual’s hidden bias can 
subconsciously influence decisions, allowing individuals to rely heavily on flawed 
heuristics that can expose one to potentially ineffective decision making. Advisors can 
help public leaders think through complexity and assist in both recognizing and 
mitigating the influence of bias and heuristics. While by no means a comprehensive 
solution, this thesis argues that advisors do aid executive decision makers to lessen the 
exposure to such bias that may unduly influence the outcome of decision making. 
2. Existing Advice Literature Is Leader-Centric and Not Advisor-
Centric 
This literature review recognizes that while there is ample guidance about the 
advice process available with a focus on the leader, there is less written about the advice 
process with a focus on the advisor. This thesis contributes to this advisor-centric dialog 
by offering additional insight as recommendations.  
In the face of this increasingly complex world, the role of advisors as a central 
component of a leadership theory is underexplored. Scholars have long examined the role 
of advice over time, but the advice process that supports contemporary leaders and how 
those advisors provide this advice has received less focus. Arnold Meltsner’s examination 
of advice in Rules for Rulers is salient, but stands in as one of very few offerings for 
public leaders on the topic. Furthermore, Meltsner’s work does not benefit from advances 
in social science with which we have access today. Some of this lacking dialog may be 
due in part to the seemingly vague description of an advisor. While absent the specificity 
of a particular job title, the features of an advisor are prevalent in a wide range of 
responsibilities. Further narrowing the scope of an advisor to a specific title limits the 
broad and far-reaching implications of studying the advice process.  
Historical works, such as Machiavelli’s The Prince, and more modern writings 
such as Meltsner’s Rules for Rulers provide insight into the advice process. However, 
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their focus remains directly centered on the leader. In both works, the author plays the 
role of an advisor in his writing, lending perspective and guidance to a reader, who is 
presumed to be an executive in their own right. This perspective, although valuable, 
leaves a glaring gap in the academic literature. Since advisors exist to guide leaders, who 
then offers guidance on how best to offer someone else advice? This thesis argues the 
wide-ranging domain of leadership literature benefits from a new way of thinking about 
advice with an advisor-centric perspective and will address this further in the 
recommendations section.  
As highlighted by Barbara Kellerman in her work The End of Leadership, the 
study of leadership has evolved over time and even exists today as a cottage industry 
whereby corporate leadership programs are marketed as solutions to leadership 
development.170 While much of the modern era of leadership literature has focused on 
the leader as an individual, Kellerman asserts that 21st century leadership theory is 
shifting the focus to the follower and the importance of good followership. As she 
explains: 
Part of the problem is with mistaken assumptions. We think leadership is 
static—it is not… we think of context as being of secondary or even 
tertiary importance—which is wrong-headed. We think leader-
centrically—that being a leader is better and more important than being a 
follower. Wrong again.171 
In applying Kellerman’s explanation, anyone who is not the leader is by default a 
follower. Advisors therefore would meet this definition. However, this thesis embraces 
the role of an advisor as a uniquely positioned follower, one that can and should offer 
meaningful guidance to leaders, particularly in the face of increasing complexity. This 
research supports the assertion that moving away from a leader-centric approach and 
toward one that embraces followership is warranted, particularly followers that are 
uniquely positioned to provide advice to leaders with executive decision-making 
responsibilities.  
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3. An Understanding of Crisis Is Critical for Advisors in the Homeland 
and National Security Domains 
Advances in technology and the previously identified increases to 
interdependency highlight the need for new strategic approaches to managing crisis 
events. The pressures, constraints, lack of complete information and overall uncertainty 
associated with crises create significant challenges for leaders to navigate. Advisors who 
understand the evolution of crisis will benefit from a comprehension of the five critical 
tasks associated with managing crisis. Advisors would be well served to focus on the 
sense-making and decision-making tasks as their influence can be both meaningful and 
significant. 
B. THE ADVICE PROCESS FROM A PRACTITIONER’S PERSPECTIVE  
This work applies case study methodology to examine the perspective of 
practitioners who both give and receive advice. The selected case studies focused on 
cabinet-level officials with homeland and national security responsibilities who served as 
both the public leader of a bureaucratic governmental organization and also an advisor to 
a chief executive. Additional insight regarding the advice process is gleaned from 
analyzing relevant anecdotes expressed in each individual’s own words. The case study 
review uses three dimensions: philosophy and approach to the advice process; the people 
and key characteristics associated with the advice process; and the advice process during 
an evolving crisis circumstance.  
Based on this analysis and the findings identified in Chapter VII, the following 
conclusions regarding the advice process are significant factors impacting effectiveness: 
• Strong trust relationships: The analysis demonstrates that all three case 
studies indicate trust relationships between chief executives and advisors 
are key components of effectiveness. The Ridge and Gates case studies 
demonstrate this aspect as central to their overall philosophy and approach 
to the advice process. Gates further asserts that strong trust relationships 
with and among other advisors is a contributing factor. For the Clinton 
case study, this feature was more noticeable in the people and 
characteristics of advisors with whom she worked closely. 
• Observation and adaptation to the chief executive: Examples in both 
the Ridge and Clinton case studies demonstrate the importance of learning 
 73 
the preferences of the chief executive and understanding how to interact 
and appeal to their particular style for absorbing information. 
• Candid and straightforward advice: This aspect was most prominent in 
the Gates case study, but was identifiable within the Ridge case study as 
well. For Ridge, frank and honest advice manifested itself as direct access 
to the president when seeking to make his case for a cabinet-level 
department. While the Clinton text did not directly identify this factor, it 
was a significant aspect of the anecdote regarding the bin Laden raid, 
when Clinton provides this honest, candid advice on a very difficult, 
sensitive issue. 
These conclusions are offered as the most salient observations based on the 
findings previously discussed.  
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In addition to the conclusions offered in the previous chapter, this thesis attempts 
to further distill these conclusions with actionable guidance to benefit advisors and the 
public leaders they serve. These recommendations are not intended to provide a complete 
or comprehensive solution to ensure effectiveness and guarantee a successful 
advisor/advisee relationship; however, they do seek to contribute to addressing the 
previously identified gap in this discourse: providing advisor-centric advice to advisors. 
Recommendations are framed as advisor-centric but offered specifically for those who 
serve as advisors and public leaders who seek to ensure an effective relationship with 
advisors. There is also a recommendation to benefit advisors and public leaders jointly. 
Finally, recommendations for future study are offered to assist researchers interested to 
further explore this particular subject area.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADVISORS 
• Recommendation 1: Advisors should strive for, value, and actively 
maintain a relationship of mutual trust with the leaders they support and 
advisors with whom they interact.  
The findings of the case study analysis highlight that a strong relationship of trust 
is a valuable component for an effective and successful relationship between a leader and 
an advisor. There was also enough evidence offered in case studies to suggest that trust 
relationships with other advisors is also advantageous, as was recommended by the Gates 
case study. While the idea of establishing trust with the executive seems like an obvious 
conclusion, it is interesting to note that examples of this trust relationship were prevalent 
with both long time loyalists and individuals with whom the advisor and executive were 
not well acquainted, as was the case with subject matter experts advising Ridge, the entire 
staff supporting Gates, or even the special envoys appointed by Clinton. In all cases, it 
appears that competency and adherence to the leader’s established expectations were key 
features in effectiveness.  
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• Recommendation 2: Advisors should observe and adapt to the chief 
executive and the environmental conditions in which they exist.  
As indicated in the findings section, a central component to the advice process is 
providing feedback in a manner in which it may best be absorbed by the executive 
decision maker. Observing, absorbing and adapting your own presentation style to that of 
the executive is not only advantageous, but essential to effectiveness. This 
recommendation also encompasses a certain amount of flexibility. The advisor has a 
responsibility to comprehend the preferences and expectations of the executive, but they 
also must become keenly aware of how the executive prefers to consume information, 
when they are open to absorbing an opposing viewpoint and how to frame an issue or 
decision so the executive may comprehend its complexity and address it at the most 
appropriate time and place. Advisors are most effective when they take time to observe, 
learn from and appeal to the analytical preferences of the leader. This may be the most 
valuable point an advisor can derive from this recommendation, that offering advice to an 
executive decision maker is far from a one-size-fits-all approach.  
• Recommendation 3: Advisors should understand, appreciate, and practice 
the nuances of candidate, frank and straightforward advice.  
The case studies also highlighted the value of candid and honest advice; however, 
it is important to note that this alone is unlikely to lead to the effective and meaningful 
relationship an advisor seeks to cultivate. Honest and candid dialog is important, but in 
order to be effective, it must reflect the existence of the previous two recommendations 
(trust and adaptation).  
Arguably the provision of honest, straightforward advice is the most important 
objective an advisor can pursue. It is the essence of being an advisor—someone who 
seeks to provide effective guidance and can speak “truth to power.” However, if an 
advisor lacks a meaningful trust relationship and fails to observe and adapt to the stylistic 
preferences or environmental conditions that exist, then any open, honest and candid 
input will not only be lost, but potentially misunderstood, misinterpreted or completely 
ignored. The provision of forthright information can often include numerous external 
factors, selecting the appropriate time and place, the appropriate audience and the 
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appropriate language. This thesis does not presume to study all of those conditions nor 
will it attempt to prescribe a specific solution, other than to suggest those conditions 
likely require significant experience and sensitivity on the part of the advisor and 
additional study. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC LEADERS WORKING WITH 
ADVISORS 
For the chief executive, there are key takeaways, as well.  
• Recommendation 1: Public leaders should stablish and cultivate a culture 
of advice.  
The case studies illuminate the importance of establishing a culture of advice that 
is understood and embraced within the organization and amongst all advisors. This 
culture often includes clear expectations, particularly when it comes to frank and candid 
input. It is possible to cultivate an advice environment that respects the chain of 
command while also enables speaking truth to power. Candid and honest input is the 
cornerstone of sound advice and public leaders should embrace and endorse these 
objectives. However, executives should be clear about expectations and communicate 
them often. As noted in the findings section, the trust relationship is a mutual one and 
must exist for both the executive and the advisor. 
• Recommendation 2: Public leaders should cultivate a stronger 
understanding of crisis decision making and the role advisors play in 
offering guidance. 
This recommendation is rooted in the research of Boin et al., as they offer ample 
insight into the tasks associated with addressing crises. Advisors can offer valuable 
guidance and support in addressing the five critical tasks to manage crises events. This 
thesis argues for special attention paid to the sense-making and decision-making tasks 




C. RECOMMENDATION FOR BOTH ADVISORS AND PUBLIC LEADERS 
• Recommendation 1: Both advisors and public leaders should embrace the 
role of an advisor as a choice architect.   
The most meaningful recommendation this thesis can offer is to suggest a new 
way of viewing the role of advisors who serve public leaders. Behavioral scientist and 
economist Richard Thaler and his research colleague Cass Sunstein argue that choice 
architecture, or “nudges,” are a pervasive part of how people make choices in their daily 
lives.172 This thesis suggests that advisors and the leaders they support should embrace 
the role of advisors in providing a similar architecture for senior decision-makers. Simply 
put: advisors are choice architects responsible for creating the appropriate environment 
for leaders to make decisions.  
This position is suggested by understanding Costa’s argument about complexity, 
that no one person can expect to solve increasingly complex problems alone. It is further 
supported through an understanding of crisis, when the sense-making and decision-
making phases demand making determinations about a circumstance from weak and 
potentially unclear signals or incomplete information and further must appropriately 
sequence the decisions necessary to address the crisis under constraints of time.  
The argument that advisors serve as choice architects is also rooted in an analysis 
of the case studies. Ridge acknowledges his reliance on a mix subject matter experts and 
personal aides to grasp the appropriate information needed to address evolving crisis in 
the anthrax event. Gates prominently recognizes his reliance on staff advisors to channel 
lower priority issues and ensure his focus would remain on the more pressing matters 
requiring attention. While Gates acknowledges this strategy would run risks, his 
leadership as the executive serves as an appropriate check and balance to the choice 
architects who may have failed to see the signs of an evolving crisis. Clinton describes a 
reliance on key staff to manage the day-to-day bureaucracy, make key choices about the 
diplomacy process and even guide sensitive negotiations. She played the role of a choice 
architect of sorts to the president, appealing to his analytical style during the decision to 
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launch the raid against Osama bin Laden. In a subtle way, Clinton’s work to address the 
relationship with Pakistan helped frame the risk analysis from a political perspective. 
Leaders simply do not have the time to manage and prioritize the myriad issues 
they face each day alone. They must empower the work of choice architects, with the 
appropriate checks and balances applied by the executive to structure the environments 
and agendas of the issues and decisions they face. Embracing advisors as choice 
architects and the advice process as a form of choice architecture goes beyond the one-
dimensional definition of setting an agenda or serving as a gatekeeper to the executive. 
Choice architects are responsible for creating the environment and conditions for decision 
making. Thaler and Sunstein describe examples of small nudges to encourage better 
behavior through product placement or policy implementation. The same can be said for 
advisors, who must go beyond simply stating a position or advocating for a one-sided 
opinion. Advisors as choice architects are responsible for understanding the 
environmental conditions that lead to good decision making on the part of the executive 
and must work to identify or create the appropriate environmental factors when the 
executive can best receive, comprehend and synthesize the information needed to make 
good choices.  
The challenge with choice architecture is a cynical view. Cynics would argue 
such a responsibility may be viewed as manipulative, exerting an undue influence over 
the decisions of the executive. This viewpoint may also identify choice architects as 
usurping control or exposing executives to potential abuses of power by lower tier staff. 
Yet, as is argued by Thaler and Sunstein, it is impossible to make choices free of the 
influence and bias of others. Choice architecture acknowledges the influence of others 
and advocates that through an open understanding and embrace of this relationship, both 
the leader and advisor can be clear to establish parameters and expectations that meet the 
needs of the leader. By adhering to this recommendation and embracing the role advisors 
play in serving as choice architects, both the advisor and executive decision maker can 
operate in the advisory relationship free of cynicism. 
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
This thesis provides a small contribution to a valuable dialog about the role of 
advisors and the need for leaders to value the team of advisors that support them. 
Furthermore, there is a distinct need to shift some of the leadership studies away from a 
leader-centric focus and toward a more robust advisor-centric examination of advisory 
arrangements within bureaucratic organizations. While this thesis makes the case for the 
value of leaders teaming up with advisors, future areas of research could explore the 
dynamics of group interaction and communication among and between advisors and the 
advisory arrangements, formal and informal, that may help or hurt the advice process. 
Future studies would benefit from a more robust examination of the advice process at 
different levels of government and whether or how such differences may influence 
recommendations for advisors.  
Lastly, there is ample opportunity to expand the topic of crisis management and 
its impact on advisors and the outcomes of decisions. The topic of crises management, 
particularly in the homeland security, national security and public safety domains, is and 
will continue to be of significant interest to both academics and practitioners. Yet the way 
crises occur will likely continue to change as technology and interdependencies continue 
to evolve within and across societies. Both leaders and advisors will benefit from a better 
understanding of and appreciation for these conditions.  
E. CLOSING COMMENTS 
At the conclusion of the Correspondent’s Association Dinner on Saturday, April 
30, 2011, President Obama offered a final round of handshakes to the guests seated on 
the dais and then departed. Attendees were thanked by the emcee, and the mood shifted 
from a disciplined and attentive to a noisy and celebratory. Less than 24 hours later, 
President Obama would make another appearance before an audience; however, this one 
would be nationally televised and one of much greater significance.  
On the evening of Sunday, May 1, the president announced a message of closure 
to a nearly decade-long manhunt for the mastermind behind the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. President Obama explained, “Tonight, I can report to the American 
 81 
people and to the world that the United States has conducted an operation that killed 
Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, and a terrorist who’s responsible for the murder 
of thousands of innocent men, women, and children.”173 Obama’s remarks continued, as 
he described the outcome of the raid and the process by which he arrived at authorizing 
such action. His description included a small, yet notable reference:  
I met repeatedly with my national security team as we developed more 
information about the possibility that we had located bin Laden hiding 
within a compound deep inside of Pakistan. And finally, last week, I 
determined that we had enough intelligence to take action, and authorized 
an operation to get Osama bin Laden and bring him to justice.  
The president’s comment, though relatively discrete, highlights the role that 
advisors played in debating the merits of the information and action.  
Earlier that same day and long before the public announcement, President Obama 
and his advisors gathered in the Situation Room at the White House. The meeting was 
called to monitor the activity on the ground as U.S. Special Forces carried out the raid in 
Abbottabad, Pakistan, targeting the suspected compound believed to be home to Osama 
bin Laden. Though the ultimate decision for authorizing the raid rested on the shoulders 
of President Obama, he was not without the input, guidance, debate and support of others 
in arriving at this decision. 
Though public leaders at different levels of government rarely face decisions of 
this scale and complexity, public leadership at all levels of government share one 
significant feature in common with this example. Public leaders are ultimately 
responsible for making these important decisions; however, they do not do so alone or 
without the support and guidance of a team of advisors.  
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